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SURROGATE PARENTING: WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM OUR
BRITISH COUNTERPARTS
Surrogate parenting, a relatively recent reproductive phe-
nomenon, allows infertile couples to have a biologically-related
child. Supporters hail this procedure as a revolution in the in-
fertility field, while critics condemn it as nothing more than
baby selling. This Note analyzes the legislative and judicial re-
sponses to surrogate arrangements in Britain and the United
States. The author argues that surrogate parenting arrange-
ments should be permitted when the surrogate mother gives in-
formed consent and the natural father and his wife are found to
be worthy parents.
SUPPORTERS call it a blessed reproductive advancement. "The
essence of the surrogate motherhood contract [they argue] is to
redress the injustice of nature in conferring this capacity on cer-
tain individuals who are able but unwilling to assume parental re-
sponsibilities while denying it to others who are willing but unable
to do so. '"1 Opponents describe it as a most unnatural form of re-
production. They believe the adoptive parents "transform the sur-
rogate into a container, a nonhuman box for gestating a fetus."2
Those who have not yet made any moral judgments about the pro-
cedure simply refer to it by its given name: "Surrogate Parent-
ing." They view it only as a procedure which enables an infertile
woman and her husband to have a biologically-related child by
contracting with a "surrogate mother" who agrees to be artifi-
cially inseminated with the husband's sperm and to relinquish all
rights to the child after the infant is born.3 These contrasting
1. Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL L.J. 147, 158.
2. Surrogacy = Baby Selling, A.BA. J., June 1, 1987, at 38, 38 (comment of
George Annas, Professor of Health Law at Boston University's School of Public Health).
3. INFERTILITY CENTER OF NEW YORK, ALTERNATIVES FOR CHILDLESS COUPLES
(no date). This brochure describes the center's entire surrogacy process. The process begins
when an inquiry is made, either by telephone or by letter. Then the infertile couple visits
the center, meets with an administrator, and reviews the surrogate mother files. The couple
then signs a contract with the center and pays the agency a fee. After the contract is
signed a surrogate mother is selected and given a physical examination. The infertile
couple has the option of meeting with the chosen surrogate mother. The surrogate mother
and the commissioning couple then meet with legal representatives and sign a surrogacy
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views demonstrate to some degree the amount of controversy cre-
ated by surrogate parenting.
In both Great Britain and the United States, there have been
landmark cases dealing with the procedure of surrogate parenting.
In Britain, the subject of the litigation was referred to as Baby
Cotton; in the United States she was known as Baby M. Each
child sent the medical experts, legal professors, justices, and legis-
lators of her country running to find solutions to the problems
presented by surrogacy.4 In Britain, the major controversy cen-
tered on the commercial aspect of surrogacy,5 while in the United
States the debate revolved around the surrogate mother's right to
keep the child.
In each country the justices faced enormous difficulties in for-
mulating solutions to these problems, largely because at the time
these cases were brought to trial there was no legislation upon
which the justices could rely in rendering their decisions. In Brit-
ain, the presiding judge based his custody determination on the
best interests of the child, and left the more complex issue of
whether surrogacy should be outlawed to Parliament.' In the
United States, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that adop-
tion laws were applicable to the facts of the case, but stipulated
that it was in everyone's best interest for the legislature to act on
contract. The agency makes the medical arrangements for the artificial insemination of the
surrogate mother, and counseling is given to the commissioning couple. If the couple has
chosen not to make personal contact with the surrogate, the agency will report to the
couple on the surrogate's progress. Once the baby is born, the infant is brought home by
the commissioning couple and the child is legally adopted by the natural father's spouse.
Id. While not all agencies operate in the same manner, the agency in the Baby "M" case
utilized this method. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 342, 525 A.2d 1128, 1142
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227
(1988). For another example of how the surrogate process works, see Surrogate Parenting
Assocs. v. Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 210-11 (Ky. 1986).
Surrogate parenting is a procedure that can be utilized by people other than infertile
couples, such as homosexuals, single men, and lesbian couples. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
1987, at 13, col. 1. For the purposes of this Note, however, only the more traditional ar-
rangement between an infertile couple and surrogate mother will be analyzed.
4. See infra section IV.
5. Harding, The Debate on Surrogate Motherhood: The Current Situation, Some
Arguments and Issues; Questions Fading Law and Policy, 1987 J. Soc. WELFARE L. 37.
Particular features giving rise to concern in this case [Baby Cotton] include the
large amount of money made by Mrs. Cotton, not just through the contract with
the agency but, more importantly, through a contract with a newspaper for her
story . . . and the fact that the arrangement was made through a commercial
agency-rather than a private agreement ..
Id. at 39.
6. Re "C" (A minor), 1985 Fam. 846, 847-48.
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the issues presented by surrogacy. As a result of their respective
cases, however, each country responded differently. In Britain,
Parliament has taken legislative action in the form of the Surro-
gacy Arrangements Act. In the United States, Congress has yet to
take legislative action.
It is the premise of this Note that we can learn from our
British counterparts not only what provisions to include in surro-
gacy legislation, but also, those not to include. It is this author's
goal to reach a more enlightened conclusion about surrogate
parenting through a close analysis of the case law, a general pres-
entation of the problems and concerns surrogacy presents, and a
study of existing proposals and legislation in both Britain and the
United States. This conclusion would permit surrogate parenting
to remain a "viable procreative alternative" for the infertile
couples of the United States, while ensuring the safety of all who
wish to use it.
I. ENGLAND: MOTHER OF THE SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS
ACT 1985
A. Baby Cotton8
On January 4, 1985, a British citizen, Kim Cotton, gave birth
to a baby girl in a British hospital. In spite of the fact that it was
a normal birth with no medical complications, this child was in no
way ordinary. Baby Cotton, as she has come to be known, was the
end product of an unusual agreement-the first commercial surro-
gate pact in the United Kingdom. The father was a United States
citizen who contacted a commercial surrogate parenting agency in
the United States when his wife learned that she had a congenital
defect which prevented her from having children. The American
agency contacted its counterpart in England and made the neces-
sary arrangements. In 1984 Mr. A, the father, flew to England to
artificially inseminate Mrs. Cotton.
All went as planned until the baby's birth, when an officer of
the London Borough of Barnet obtained a "place of safety or-
der,"" preventing Mr. A and Mrs. A from taking the infant home.
7. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 372, 525 A.2d 1128, 1157 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1987), affd in part, revd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). "Viable
procreative alternative" is a term of art, used by Judge Sorkow in this case.
8. Re "C" (A minor), 1985 Farn. 846.
9. A "place of safety order" is an order obtained by a local authority, in this case the
London Borough of Barnet, to keep the child in a designated safe place until further in-
2191988-89]
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A wardship summons1 ° was issued, and the case was tried before
Justice Latey.
To his credit, Justice Latey did not underestimate the com-
plexity of this particular case:
Plainly, the methods used to produce a child as this baby
has been, and the commercial aspects of it, raise difficult and
delicate problems of ethics, morality and social desirability ...
Are [these problems] relevant in arriving at a decision on what
now and, so far as one can tell, in the future is best for this
child? . . . In my judgment . . . they are not relevant.11
Justice Latey further commented that "the moral, ethical and
social considerations are for others and not for this court in its
wardship jurisdiction, 12 revealing his choice to decide the case
according to the best interests of the child, and leave the law-mak-
ing to those best suited to handle it. He arranged for the immedi-
ate delivery of the child to Mr. and Mrs. A, committing to them
the care and control of the child. The couple was allowed to leave
the country with her, under the condition they return with her to
England upon the court's order.1 3 The court further protected the
child by maintaining guardianship over Baby Cotton. The rule in
England is that "where a child is a ward of [the] court there must
be no publicity [regarding the ward], save with leave of the
court."
'14
With child in hand, Mr. and Mrs. A left England to return
home to the United States. The British public was outraged at the
court for condoning such illicit behavior. The result of this social
upheaval was the enactment of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act
1985.15 Solicitor Susan Sloman announced it as "the Govern-
ment's response to the public outcry which followed the Baby Cot-
quiry is made into the child's background. In this case the baby was left in the care of the
nurses in the hospital. The Borough probably felt that the order was necessary because
Mrs. Cotton left the baby a few hours after the birth and before the father came to collect
it.
10. See W. FRANK, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ENGLISH LAW 31-33 (4th ed.
1969). A wardship summons can be described in the following manner: Upon application to
the Chancery Division of the high court, the infant automatically becomes a ward of the
court. The high court then has the ability to appoint a guardian for that infant. Id.
11. Re "C" (A minor), 1985 Fain. 846.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Sloman, Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, 135 NEW L.J. 978, 978 (1985).
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ton case."16 The Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, however, was
not the first governmental response to surrogate parenting. Six-
and-one-half months before Baby Cotton came to trial, the War-
nock Committee spoke on the issue of surrogate parenting.
B. Paving the Way: The Warnock Report
Dame Mary Warnock was the Chair of the Committee of
Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology,1" which au-
thored the "Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fer-
tilisation and Embryology." 8 The Warnock Committee, as it is
often referred to, represented all those who had an interest in the
new technologies designed to aid the infertile. Its membership in-
cluded the Secretary of State for Social Services, the Secretary of
State for Education and Science, and the Secretaries of State for
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. x9 The primary purpose of
the Report was "to consider recent and potential developments in
medicine and science related to human fertilisation and embryol-
ogy; to consider what policies and safeguards should be applied,
including consideration of the social, ethical and legal implications
of these developments; and to make recommendations."20
Surrogacy was one of the many techniques the Committee
chose to consider. 2' Chapter eight of the Report is dedicated solely
to surrogacy. It is broken down into twenty segments, each
describing a particular aspect of the procedure. The more relevant
sections are: section 8.1, defining surrogacy;2 2 section 8.2, listing
the circumstances under which surrogacy may be a valid procrea-
tive alternative;2 3 section 8.3, describing payment;24 section 8.4,
16. Id.
17. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EM-
BRYOLOGY, 1984, CMND. No. 9314 [hereinafter THE REPORT].
18. Id.
19. Id. at introductory page.
20. Id. at 4; Harding, supra note 5, at 48.
21. THE REPORT, supra note 17, at 17-53. The various techniques discussed include:
artificial insemination, in vitro fertilisation, egg donation, embryo donation, surrogacy, and
the freezing and storage of semen, eggs, and embryos. Id.
22. Id. at 42. The committee defined surrogacy as "the practice whereby one woman
carries a child for another with the intention that the child should be handed over after
birth." Id.
23. Id. The circumstances where surrogacy is desirable are: "[w]here a woman has
severe pelvic disease which cannot be remedied surgically, or has no uterus, . . . [when a
woman has] suffered repeated miscarriages, . . . [or when a woman] suffers from a condi-
tion making pregnancy medically undesirable." Id.
24. Id. at 42-43. The committee acknowledged that some form of payment is gener-
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
indicating the legal status of surrogacy; 5 section 8.5, invalidating
the surrogate contract;26 section 8.6, defining the primary function
of the courts in surrogate parenting arrangements;27 section 8.7,
listing possible post-negotiation conflicts; 28 section 8.9, discussing
the father's position;29 and most importantly sections 8.10 through
8.16, listing the general arguments for and against surrogacy.50
ally involved. It stated that, "[playment may vary between reimbursement of expenses, and
a substantial fee." Id.
25. Id. at 43. The committee noted that "[tihe practice is not in itself unlawful." Id.
26. Id.
There is little doubt that the Courts would treat most, if not all, surrogacy
agreements as contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable.. . . Thus,
if the carrying mother changed her mind and decided she wished to keep the
child it is most unlikely that a court would order her, because she had previously
agreed to do so, to hand over the child against her will. Nor in such a case would
a court order the surrogate mother to repay any fee paid to her under the terms
of the agreement.
Id.
27. Id.
The Courts do, however, have jurisdiction over children which is quite separate
from and independent of the law of contract. Where a court has to consider the
future of a child born following a surrogacy agreement, it must do so in accor-
dance with the child's best interests in all the circumstances of the case, and not
according to the terms of any agreement between the various adults.
Id.
28. Id. at 44. "Apart from the most obvious [example] of the surrogate mother
changing her mind, it may. . . be discovered that the child is handicapped or the commis-
sioning mother may die or become disabled." Id.
29. Id.
As regards enforcing any surrogacy agreement to which he is [a] party, the
commissioning father faces the difficulties [that arise because courts will not en-
force contracts]. He may also be vulnerable to a claim by the carrying mother
for an affiliation order if she keeps the child and the court might or might not
make such an order according to the facts of the particular case.
Id.
30. Id. at 44-46. The committee first stated in § 8.10:
The objections turn essentially on the view that to introduce a third party into
the process of procreation which should be confined to the loving partnership
between two people, is an attack on the value of the marital relationship. . . It
is also argued that it is inconsistent with human dignity that a woman should
use her uterus for financial profit and treat it as an incubator for someone else's
child.
In § 8.11 the committee wrote:
It is argued that the relationship between mother and child is itself distorted by
surrogacy [because] a woman deliberately allows herself to become pregnant
with the intention of giving up the child to which she will give birth . . . . It is
also potentially damaging to the child, whose bonds with the carrying mother,
regardless of genetic connections, are held to be strong, and whose welfare must
be considered to be of paramount importance. [Also surrogacy is] degrading to
the child [who has] been bought for money.
[Vol. 39:217
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Chapter eight concludes with the view that surrogate parenting
agencies and contracts should be outlawed:
We recommend that legislation be introduced to render
criminal the creation or the operation in the United Kingdom of
agencies whose purposes include the recruitment of women for
surrogate pregnancy or making arrangements for individuals or
couples who wish to utilise the services of a carrying mother;
such legislation should be wide enough to include both profit and
non-profit making organisations. We further recommend that
the legislation be sufficiently wide to render criminally liable the
actions of professionals and others who knowingly assist in the
establishment of a surrogate pregnancy.
. ..We recommend that it be provided by statute that all
surrogacy agreements are illegal contracts and therefore unen-
forceable in the courts.
3 1
That there be no mistaking the Committee's disapproval of
commercial surrogacy, the provisions of this particular part of the
Report are offset in boldface type. Among the suggestions that
were not offset in boldface type are those which involve surrogacy
for convenience's sake, and convenience's sake alone.32 The Com-
mittee stated that when "people . .. treat others as a means to
their own ends, however desirable the consequences, [their ac-
tions] must always be open to moral objection." 33 The majority, as
well as the minority of the Committee, found this type of activity
Section 8.12 concludes: "Since there are some risks attached to pregnancy, no woman
ought to be asked to undertake pregnancy for another ...."
Section 8.13 begins the arguments in support of surrogacy: "If infertility is a condition
which should, where possible, be remedied, it is argued that surrogacy must not be ruled
out, since it offers to some couples their only chance of having a child genetically related to
one or both of them." Section 8.14 argues: "Where agreements are genuinely voluntary,
there can be no question of exploitation, nor does the fact that surrogates will be paid for
their pregnancy of itself entail exploitation of either party to the agreement." Section 8.15
refutes the argument regarding intrusion into the marriage relationship: Those who are
against it "should not seek to prevent others from having access to it." As to the mother/
infant bond, § 8.16 states as follows:
It is argued that as very little is actually known about the extent to which bond-
ing occurs when the child is in utero, no great claims should be made in this
respect. In any case the breaking of such bonds, even if less than ideal, is not
held to be an overriding argument against placing a child for adoption ...
Id.
31. Id. at 47, §§ 8.18-.19. Also noteworthy is that the committee recommended com-
mercial surrogacy services be outlawed as well. In their opinion, the mere presence of sur-
rogacy would encourage people to enter into these agreements. Id. at 46-47.
32. Id. at 46, § 8.17.
33. Id.
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totally abhorrent and believed it should not be tolerated under any
circumstances. Although these views were the ones recommended
to Parliament in the Report, there were other arguments set forth
by those minority members of the Committee who were in favor
of surrogacy.34
Although the minority agreed that the "criminal law should
be brought in to prevent the operation of profit making agen-
cies," 5 they disagreed on the matter of outlawing non-profit orga-
nizations.3 6 The result, they felt, would be do-it-yourself arrange-
ments totally unsupported by medical and counselling services."7
The proper approach, according to the minority, is to designate a
licensing authority with the power to approve an agency or agen-
cies for the purpose of making surrogacy arrangements.3 1 "These
arrangements would include the matching of commissioning par-
ents with surrogate mothers, and the provision of adequate coun-
selling to ensure that the legal and personal complications of sur-
rogacy were fully understood."3 9 In addition, the agencies would
have to be well versed on childcare skills,40 and access to the li-
censed agency could only be attained with a referral from a con-
sultant gynecologist.41 This would require a physician's consulta-
tion at the beginning of the procedure, where the couple could
speak openly and confidentially with a professional.
In addition, the minority argued that the adoption laws,
which prohibit payment for a child, should not prevent the com-
missioning couple from adopting the child. They argued that an
exception should be made in the law to allow for payment of med-
ical expenses and a service fee to surrogate mothers.4 2 Finally, as
to the legality of the contracts, the minority argued against hold-
ing all surrogate contracts illegal. Rather, they should be consid-
ered on an individual basis by the courts.4 It was the minority's
position that surrogacy should be left open as a last resort 44 for
34. Id. at 45.
35. Id. at 87.
36. Id. at 88. The committee noted that "[tihese arrangements would be unsup-
ported by medical and counselling services . Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 89.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 87.
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those infertile couples whose last opportunity to have a genetically
related child would be surrogate parenting. The minority closed
its arguments by saying:
We do not believe that public opinion is yet fully formed on
the question of surrogacy . . . . Thus we think it is too early to
take a final decision one way or the other. . . . We simply ask
that the door be left slightly ajar so that surrogacy can be more
effectively assessed.4
Although this final statement was written in 1982, it was
clearly regarded as relevant in 1985, when the Surrogacy Ar-
rangements Act came into being. On that fateful day in January,
1985, Parliament rendered a final decision far before all the ques-
tions had been answered.
C. The Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985
The long title of The Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985
reads as follows: "An Act to regulate certain activities in connec-
tion with arrangements made with a view to women carrying chil-
dren as surrogate mothers."4 7 Section one provides general defini-
tions;48 section two outlaws commercial surrogacy in general; 49
section three bans all advertisements of surrogacy;50 section four
describes the penalties and offenses;51 and section five provides the
short title.5 2 What astounds both critics and advocates of the Act
alike is the speed with which it was drafted and enacted. The
Baby Cotton case, from which it was inspired, was decided on
January 14, 1985. The Act was passed on July 16, 1985. Al-
though much of what is encompassed in the Act is based upon the
Warnock Committee Report,53 this Act of Parliament virtually
came into existence overnight. In short, Parliament put only some
of the Warnock Committee's proposals into effect. Unfortunately,
in adopting the minority's proposition, outlawing only commercial
agencies, Parliament did not provide the effect England desired,
45. Id. at 89. It should be noted, however, that the minority does not use the term
"genetically." It is this author's choice to use that word here.
46. Id.
47. Surrogacy Arrangements Act, ch. 49 (1985).
48. Id. § 1.
49. Id. §2.
50. Id. § 3.
51. Id. § 4.
52. Id. § 5.
53. THE REPORT, supra note 17.
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including that desired by both the majority and minority of the
Warnock Committee."
As mentioned above, at the center of the current British de-
bate on surrogacy lie the alleged inadequacies of section two of
the Surrogacy Arrangements Act.5 That section provides that no
person, i.e., an agent or agency, "shall on a commercial basis...
initiate or take part in any negotiations with a view to the making
of a surrogacy arrangement, or. . . compile any information with
a view to its use in making, or negotiating the making of, [a] sur-
rogacy arrangement. . . .1"5 However, this flat prohibition is rid-
dled with exemptions, which is where the trouble begins. It is not
a violation of the Act "for a woman, with a view to becoming a
surrogate mother herself," to negotiate or make arrangements
with a commissioning couple on her own behalf 5 7 Nor is it a vio-
lation of the Act "for any person, with a view to [becoming a
father]," to negotiate a deal or to arrange for a surrogate mother
to carry his child.58 Clearly there are problems to be contended
with here. Attorneys and commercial agents are the only individu-
als penalized by this Act. The surrogate mothers and biological
fathers, on the other hand, are free to engage in as many transac-
tions as they wish. This has caused a flood of scholarly criticism.
As one critic stated: "If surrogacy is undesirable, it should have
been prohibited altogether. Settling for this approach might be
thought to legitimate some forms of agreement. 51 9 It clearly legit-
imates some forms of agreement. As another critic noted, "non-
profit-making arrangements were not made illegal by this Act
• . . [because it is] still legal for the surrogate mother herself to
receive a fee. . . . Private arrangements directly between individ-
54. Parliament probably saw itself as adopting one of the majority's recommenda-
tions as well; the majority stated: "It is . . . with the commercial exploitation of surrogacy
that we have been primarily, but by no means exclusively, concerned." Id. at 46. In other
words, perhaps Parliament attempted to adopt propositions of both the majority and the
minority. However, as will be indicated in section IV (A) and IV (B)(1) of this Note,
Parliament did not enact the minority's recommendations as written, and consequently the
law they passed was most insubstantial. British critic Susan Sloman also noted that Parlia-
ment did not adopt all of the minority's recommendations: "A major weakness of the Act is
that it permits surrogacy but does not follow all of the minority's recommendations."
Sloman, supra note 15, at 980.
55. Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, ch. 49.
56. Id. §2.
57. Id. § 2(2)(a).
58. Id. § 2(2)(b).
59. Morgan, Who to Be or Not to Be: The Surrogacy Story, 49 MoD. L. REv. 358,
365 (1986).
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uals [do] not constitute an offence."60 Finally, one commentator
noted that, "to say that the Act outlaws commercial surrogacy is
inaccurate, because remuneration may pass between the parties to
the arrangement." '81 It is discouraging to find the drafters so in-
consistent. How can one take an act seriously if it nullifies its own
proposition?
Although some may argue that commercial surrogacy is
worse than voluntary surrogacy, others maintain it is actually the
lesser of two evils. Obtaining the services of a commercial surro-
gate will often benefit the child because his biological mother will
be "a woman totally outside the family circle with no emotional
claims on the baby."62 In other words, in voluntary arrangements,
the surrogate mother is likely to have some kind of personal
knowledge of the commissioning couple. Thus, the likelihood she
will become emotionally tied to the child is extremely high, as she
already has some affection for the commissioning parents. If the
surrogate arrangement is made through an agency, however, the
personal contact between the surrogate mother and the commis-
sioning couple is kept to a bare minimum. The surrogate is not
made to feel like one of the family. This insulating effect helps to
keep her mind on the arrangement's true objective: the surrender-
ing of the child to the infertile couple. Although it sounds
mechanical, this arrangement may be for the best.63 As Ms.
Brahams states, "[m]orally and legally [the surrogate mother]
should have no claim to the child at its birth.""
Finally, another critic notes that "[i]n seeking to outlaw only
commercial surrogacy agencies the Act falls short of the Warnock
Committee's majority recommendation that all surrogacy arrange-
ments should be subject to criminal penalties."6 5 Thus, the door is
left wide open for private arrangements, where patients cannot be
monitored, counselling cannot be required, and people can be
exploited.
60. Harding, supra note 5, at 52.
61. Sloman, supra note 15, at 978.
62. Brahams, The Hasty British Ban on Commercial Surrogacy, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Feb. 1987, at 16, 17.
63. But see infra note 252 and accompanying text. It should also be noted that the
Warnock Committee feared the mechanical use of women as well. The committee stated,
"[i]t is also argued that it is inconsistent with human dignity that a woman should use her
uterus for financial profit and treat it as an incubator for someone else's child." THE RE-
PORT, supra note 17, at 45.
64. Brahams, supra note 62, at 17.
65. Sloman, supra note 15, at 978.
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In response to the critics' outcries, an amendment has been
proposed to the Surrogacy Arrangements Act. It is called the Sur-
rogacy Arrangements (Amendment) Bill 1985-6, and it "was in-
troduced into the House of Lords in late 1985, and passed through
its Committee and Report stages in 1986."' 66 The main purpose of
the amendment is to outlaw all surrogacy arrangements "whether
made with a view to payment or not."' 67 Any form of surrogacy is
illegal under this bill."8
In the meantime, until the amendment is passed, the govern-
ment is still looking for answers on the subject of surrogacy. In
December of 1986, a document entitled "Legislation on Human
Infertility Services and Embryo Research: A Consultation Docu-
ment" 69 was sent to legal authorities and organizations. As of the
writing of this Note, no copy of the document was available, but
solicitor Diana Parker describes the document as follows:
[A] mere 13 pages long and succinctly set out in four sections
which: (a) give a brief account of the main infertility treatments
under consideration; (b) outline developments since the War-
nock Report; (c) comment on those recommendations where
consultation so far suggests that a broad measure of agreement
is likely; [and] (d) deal with those recommendations where a
significant division of opinion can be expected to continue.70
As Ms. Parker states:
The purpose of this consultation document seems to be, pri-
marily, to elicit more detailed comments in respect of recom-
mendations of the Warnock Committee which have so far re-
ceived relatively little attention, but a secondary purpose is...
to reopen certain controversial areas, presumably in the hope of
66. H. BLACK & D. BROWN, AN OUTLINE OF ENGLISH LAW 61-62 (1966); Harding,
supra note 5, at 55. In order for a bill to pass in England, it must go through several
stages. First, an initial reading in the House of Commons introduces the title of the bill.
Then a second reading provides the member introducing the bill an opportunity to speak on
its behalf. The House of Commons then votes for or against the bill. If it passes, it moves
on to the committee stage. The bill is considered by a committee and then returned to the
House at the Report Stage. On the "Third Reading," final debate occurs "and takes place
on the general merits of the bill in its present form." If passed in the House of Commons,
it moves on to the House of Lords. If the Lords agree that it should be law, then the bill
becomes law. H. BLACK & D. BROWN, supra, at 61-62.
67. Harding, supra note 5, at 55.
68. Id.
69. Parker, Legislation on Human Infertility Services and Embryo Research, 17
FAM. L. 168, 168 (1987).
70. Id. It should be noted that this document refers to artificial reproductive proce-
dures in general, surrogacy being among them.
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establishing greater consensus.71
This purpose seems to be consistent with the Warnock Commit-
tee's minority opinion, which calls for a consensus before an effec-
tive decision is reached.
The legislative response to Baby Cotton indicates a willing-
ness to please the public.7 2 In its earnest effort to appease its pub-
lic, however, the British government forgot one thing: change
takes time. The Warnock Committee's minority recognized this,
but Parliament failed to take notice. It takes time for people to
alter their moral beliefs, as well as to appreciate the benefits of-
fered by new technologies. The issues surrogacy presents are com-
plex and merit careful attention.
On the negative side of surrogacy, critics argue that women
should not be used as incubators because it demeans them person-
ally and turns them into machines. Babies, in turn, should not be
traded like commodities. The child's welfare should never be com-
promised by a contractual agreement. As stipulated by the War-
nock Committee, decisions bearing on the custody of the child
should be left in the hands of judges who can determine the best
interests of the child. 3 Conversely, there are positive aspects to
surrogacy: the joy it can bring to an infertile couple; the gladness
felt by the surrogate after bringing this welcomed child into the
world; and the excitement of having yet another method available
to end infertility. Britain's Act overlooked these aspects. In its ea-
gerness to please its shocked and disgruntled public, Parliament
seems to have forgotten one thing: an effective piece of legislation
cannot be drafted in haste. If the Act truly is designed to consider
the desires of British subjects, the drafters should have considered
71. Id.
72. See Harding, supra note 5, at 39.
It is this last case [Baby Cotton] which has probably been most instrumental in
provoking media and public debate and concern, even outrage, and is pressuris-
ing the government to act to ban commercial surrogacy. Particular features giv-
ing rise to concern in this case include the large amount of money made by Mrs.
Cotton, not just through the contract with the agency but, more importantly,
through a contract with a newspaper for her story . . . and the fact that the
arrangement was made through a commercial agency-rather than a private
agreement-and that that agency was American-based and the "parents" were
American.
Id. See also Morgan, supra note 59, at 363 ("In response to the 'moral panic' engendered,
in an attempt to exorcise the 'folk devils' exposed, the Government decided to anticipate
their more considered response to the proposals of the Warnock Committee and bring for-
ward this limited Act to outlaw commercial surrogacy." (footnote omitted)).
73. THE REPORT, supra note 17, at 43.
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the minority's opinion in full and followed its advice to the letter.
II. AMERICA: A LAND OF OPPORTUNITY?
A. Baby M:74 Whose Little Girl Are You?
In 1984, Mr. William Stern participated in a surrogate
mother program based in New York City.75 Through this organi-
zation, he and his wife met Mary Beth Whitehead, the woman
who would become Baby M's surrogate mother. A contract was
signed 7 and it was agreed that Mrs. Whitehead was to be paid
the sum of $10,000 and all medical expenses7 7 incurred during her
pregnancy. Close contact was maintained between the two parties
throughout the pregnancy and on March 27, 1986, Baby M was
born. In what may be considered a foreshadowing of the events to
follow, Mrs. Whitehead informed the Sterns that she was not
quite sure whether she could surrender the child. 8 She did surren-
der the girl for a short while, but on March 31, 1986, she regained
custody. By telephoning the Sterns and asking permission to see
the child, Mrs. Whitehead gained access to her. Upon arriving at
the Sterns' house, Mrs. Whitehead claimed she could not live
without the baby. Out of concern for Mrs. Whitehead's mental
health, the Sterns permitted her to take the child for a week's
visit.7 9 Mrs. Whitehead never returned with the infant. Instead,
she fled to Florida with the baby.80Although Mrs. Whitehead later
returned to New Jersey, the homestate of both her and the Sterns,
she escaped once again to Florida after the Sterns threatened her
with legal action."1 It was not until July 31, 1986, that the child
was taken into the care of Florida authorities.8 2 After law enforce-
ment officers seized the child, the Sterns were once again given
physical custody of the infant.3 What turned out to be a lengthy
and dramatic ordeal ended in Judge Harvey Sorkow's courtroom
on March 31, 1987. In a 121-page opinion, Judge Sorkow un-
74. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
75. Id. at 342, 525 A.2d at 1142.
76. Id. at 344, 525 A.2d at 1143.
77. Id. at 345, 525 A.2d at 1143.
78. Id. at 347, 525 A.2d at 1144.
79. Id. at 348, 525 A.2d at 1144.
80. Id. at 348, 525 A.2d at 1145.
81. Id. at 349-50, 525 A.2d at 1145-46.
82. Id. at 351, 525 A.2d at 1146.
83. Id.
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equivocally awarded custody to the Sterns.84
In the beginning of his opinion, Judge Sorkow described the
problems of infertility, particularly noting the desire infertile
couples have for raising genetically-linked children. 5 He under-
stood and sympathized with this desire, and consequently sympa-
thized with the Sterns. However, the focus of his opinion lay else-
where. He stated that "[t]he primary issue to be determined by
this litigation concerns the best interests of a child until now
called 'Baby M.' All other concerns raised by counsel constitute
commentary." '86 He further noted, "[w]here courts are forced to
choose between a parent's rights and a child's welfare, the choice
is and must be the child's welfare and best interest by virtue of
the court's responsibility as parens patriae.'87 Parens patriae is
the power of the state, in this case through its judicial branch, to
watch over the interests of those who are incapable of protecting
themselves, i.e., a baby.88 It was this theory, along with the theory
of contract, that Judge Sorkow utilized in rendering his decision.
Although he presented some suggestions on what the legislature
might include in a bill 9 on the issue of surrogate parenting, it was
Judge Sorkow's duty to examine and apply what little law there
was at the time." In addition, Judge Sorkow based part of his
decision on the constitutional right to be a parent,91 and on psy-
chiatric evaluations.92 Of particular interest was the opinion of Dr.
M. Schecter, who was presented as a witness by the guardian ad
litem. In Schecter's opinion, the child should have been given to
the Sterns by virtue of Mrs. Whitehead's impulsivity, manipula-
tive behavior, sense of self-importance, exploitiveness, and lack of
sympathy and empathy.9 3 That this opinion was rendered by the
84. Id. at 408, 525 A.2d at 1175.
85. Id. at 331, 525 A.2d at 1136.
86. Id. at 323, 525 A.2d at 1132. The "commentary" by counsel to which Judge
Sorkow refers,
includes the need to determine if a unique arrangement between a man and
woman, unmarried to each other, creates a contract. If so, is the contract en-
forceable; and if so, by what criteria, means and manner. If not, what are the
rights and duties of the parties with regard to custody, visitation and support.
Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 324, 525 A.2d at 1133.
89. Id. at 334, 525 A.2d at 1138.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157.
92. Id. at 357-70, 525 A.2d at 1149-56.
93. Id. at 359-60, 525 A.2d at 1150.
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child's representative seems relevant. Judge Sorkow seemed to be
of this opinion as well, even though he dismissed Dr. Schecter's
finding of a mixed-personality disorder,94 he described in detail
the aforementioned character traits.95
Judge Sorkow also found testimony by Dr. Salk, an expert
witness presented by the Sterns, to be relevant. In Salk's opinion,
the baby "needed an end to the litigation, [to] have her parentage
fixed, [to] be afforded protection from anyone who would threaten
her," and needed a strong support system.96 In Sorkow's opinion,
and perhaps that of Dr. Salk himself, although he did not say
definitively in his testimony, that strong support system was pre-
sent in the Stern household. 97
In describing Mr. Stern, Judge Sorkow made a point of em-
phasizing that he was the sole surviving member of his family. 8
Mrs. Stern, while having other members in her immediate family,
had multiple sclerosis and could not carry a child without great
risk to her physical well-being.99 The possibility of adoption was
virtually nonexistent. "[B]ecause they were of different religions
and they were 'an older couple,' adoption of a newborn infant
would be extremely difficult."' 00 Most importantly, the Sterns had
94. Id. at 359, 525 A.2d at 1150.
95. Id. at 360, 525 A.2d at 1150.
96. Id. at 364, 525 A.2d at 1152.
97. Id. at 338, 525 A.2d at 1140.
98. Id. at 335, 525 A.2d at 1138.
99. Id. at 335-36, 525 A.2d at 1138-39 (The court concluded that carrying a child
was viewed as risky at the time Mrs. Whitehead made her decision to have Baby "M",
thus the decision was reasonable.).
100. Id. at 336-37, 525 A.2d at 1139. A standard adoption procedure involves the
following: a petition, a hearing, an agency investigation, and an interlocutory and final
decree. Each of these steps is described in CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMEsTic RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES (1968). First, Clark states that, "[a]doption proceedings are initiated
when the adoptive parents file a petition. Most adoption statutes outline in more or less
detail what is to go into the petition, which is usually required to be verified and signed by
the adoptive parents." Id. at 615 (footnotes omitted). The second step, the hearing, is self-
explanatory. A judge is asked to review the petition, and other materials, as well as inter-
view the petitioning couple, to decide whether the adoption should take place. Id. at 616.
The third step, the agency investigation, takes place after the judge submits the petition for
adoption to an adoption agency. (This is required by most state statutes.) Id. at 616. The
agency then conducts its own investigation and files a report on its findings. Id. at 617.
"[1]t seems clear that the purpose of such statutes [requiring an agency investigation] is to
provide the court with as much information as is available concerning the child's back-
ground and that of the adoptive parents, information which is relevant and helpful in de-
ciding whether the adoption should proceed." Id. Lastly, the court may enter an interlocu-
tory decree, giving the adoptive parents custody of the child for a specified amount of time,
giving "the prospective adoptive parents custody of the child and impos[ing] on them for
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a promising future: they were well-educated1 ' and financially
able to raise a child in an excellent environment. 02 On the other
hand, Mrs. Whitehead was a high school dropout. 0 3 She had
worked in a pizza restaurant and then a deli, where she met her
husband Richard, whom she married at age sixteen. 04 Mr.
Whitehead had several different jobs during their marriage'015 and
was an alcohol abuser. 106 Consequently, Sorkow did not seem to
favor the Whiteheads.
Some critics, however, did not agree with Judge Sorkow. One
stated, "those critics who have labeled this custody decision a
classist opinion favoring the haves over the have nots are correct.
Justice seems to have been for sale along with Baby M.'1107 As to
the sale of Baby M, critic George Annas asked, "[w]here on this
spectrum do contracts to bear a child fall? Are they fundamen-
tally the sale of an ovum with a nine-month womb rental thrown
in, or are they really agreements to sell a baby?"'' 08 In terms of
Judge Sorkow's opinion, the answer would probably be, "this is
just an ordinary contract." This conclusion can be inferred from
Sorkow's seemingly mechanical approach to the surrogacy agree-
ment entered into by the Sterns and Mrs. Whitehead: "If the mu-
tual promises were not sufficient to establish a valid consideration,
then certainly there was consideration when there was conception.
The male gave his sperm; the female gave her egg in their pre-
planned effort to create a child-thus, a contract."' 0 9
Judge Sorkow went on to discuss further the remedies for the
most purposes the obligations of parents." Id. at 619. If the judge is satisfied with the
results following from this interlocutory decree or, if there was no interlocutory decree,
following from the hearing and the agency investigation, the judge will enter a final decree
making the adoptive parents the legal parents of the child. Id. It should be noted, again,
that this is a description of the "typical" adoption procedure; but there can be, and often is
"great variation in detail from state to state." Id. at 614. In light of the fact that this Note
deals with surrogate parenting, however, these details are of little significance. A descrip-
tion of the general adoption procedure is more than sufficient for a discussion of surrogate
parenting.
101. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. at 335-36, 525 A.2d at 1138.
102. Id. at 354-55, 525 A.2d at 1148.
103. Id. at 338, 525 A.2d at 1140.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 340, 525 A.2d at 1140-41.
106. Id. at 340, 525 A.2d at 1141.
107. Annas, Baby M: Babies (and Justice) for Sale, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June
1987, at 13, 15.
108. Annas, Contracts to Bear a Child, HASTINGS CENTER REP., April 1981, at 23,
23.
109. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. at 374, 525 A.2d at 1158.
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breach of such a contract, in light of Mrs. Whitehead's breach by
not surrendering the child. In his opinion monetary damages
would not suffice, 110 although he did not specify why. Thus, spe-
cific performance was the final solution. But how can one specifi-
cally enforce a contract demanding the relinquishment of a child?
As Judge Sorkow described it, "specific performance is a discre-
tionary remedy" and where a human life is involved, the "inquiry
must be made to determine if the result of such an order for spe-
cific performance would be in the child's best interest."'' Conve-
niently enough for him, it was. Upon finding the Sterns to be the
ideal parents for Baby M, Sorkow held that the contract was
proper for specific enforcement. Although Sorkow acknowledged,
earlier in the opinion, that "to produce or deal with a child for
money denigrates human dignity,"" 2 he once again provided an
easy answer, by arguing that a biological father cannot purchase
what is already his." 3 As far as Sorkow was concerned this was
the end. He concluded and held that surrogate parenting agree-
ments were valid and enforceable contracts pursuant to the laws
of New Jersey."" The laws of adoption, in his opinion, did not
apply to surrogacy contracts since surrogacy was not yet a viable
procreative option when the adoption laws were passed."' The
Sterns were given custody of Baby M, and the precedent, for the
time being, was set. On February 3, 1988, however, all that
changed. The Supreme Court of New Jersey stepped into the
picture.
110. Id. at 389, 525 A.2d at 1166. A child has been bargained for here; she is unique
and cannot be replaced and there is not a substitute for her. It was stated in E. FARNS-
WORTH, CONTRACTS (1982), on the subject of specific performance:
A critical factor in determining whether damages are an adequate remedy is
whether money can buy a substitute for the promised performance. If a substi-
tute can be readily obtained, the damage remedy is ordinarily regarded as ade-
quate . . . . In some situations, however, no substitute is available, or its pro-
curement would be unreasonably difficult or inconvenient or would impose
serious financial burdens or risks on the injured party.
Id. at 828-29. From this language, it can be inferred that Judge Sorkow acted correctly in
saying that monetary damages would not suffice. Since there is no substitute for a child,
specific performance seems to be the appropriate remedy for the breach of a surrogacy
contract.
111. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. at 389, 525 A.2d at 1166.
112. Id. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1166.
115. Id. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157.
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B. Baby M: The New Jersey Supreme Court Steps In"16
In a ninety-five-page opinion, Chief Justice Wilentz, of the
New Jersey Supreme Court, rendered the surrogacy contract of
Mary Beth Whitehead 117 and William Stern invalid and against
public policy:118
We invalidate the surrogacy contract because it conflicts
with the law and public policy of this State. While we recognize
the depth of the yearning of infertile couples to have their own
children, we find the payment of money to a "surrogate" mother
illegal, perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to women.
Although in this case we grant custody to the natural father, the
evidence having clearly proved such custody to be in the best
interests of the infant, we void both the termination of the surro-
gate mother's parental rights and the adoption of the child by
the wife/stepparent. We thus restore the "surrogate" as the
mother of the child. We remand the issue of the natural
mother's visitation rights to the trial court . .. ."I"
After stating the Supreme Court's conclusions, Chief Justice
Wilentz began his discussion of the case in full. He started his
discussion with the matter of surrogate parenting in general:2 0
We find no offense to our present laws where a woman vol-
untarily and without payment agrees to act as a "surrogate"
mother, provided that she is not subject to a binding agreement
to surrender her child. Moreover, our holding today does not
preclude the Legislature from altering the current statutory
scheme, within constitutional limits, so as to permit surrogacy
contracts. Under current law, however, the surrogacy agreement
before us is illegal and invalid.121
The laws Justice Wilentz referred to are adoption laws, 22
more specifically those adoption laws which "prohibit[] the use of
money in connection with adoptions; . . . requir[e] proof of paren-
tal unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights
116. In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1229 (1988).
117. Please note, for consistency throughout this text, Mary Beth Whitehead will be
referred to as Mrs. Whitehead and not Mrs. Whitehead-Gould, her new name. (She has
remarried since the original case began.).
118. In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234.
119. Id. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234-35.
120. It should be noted that Justice Wilentz is discussing the matter of surrogacy
only in the context of this case.
121. In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1235.
122. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1988, at 14, col. 3.
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is ordered. . . and. . . make surrender of custody and consent to
adoption revocable in private placement adoptions."'1 23 To assist
the reader, Justice Wilentz broke his discussion down into sections
and discussed each of these laws in the context of the case.' 24 The
first statute he considered was New Jersey Revised Statute section
9:3-54a, which "prohibits paying or accepting money in connec-
tion with . . . [an] adoption.' 25
In Justice Wilentz's opinion there was no question the Sterns
violated this section of the code.' 26 Any attempt made by them or
their attorney to disguise the payment of money to Mrs. White-
head as anything other than a payment for an adoption was re-
jected by the court:
As for the contention that the Sterns are paying only for services
and not for an adoption, we need note only that they would pay
nothing in the event the child died before the fourth month of
pregnancy, and only $1,000 if the child were stillborn, even
though the "services" had been fully rendered. 127
If the Sterns truly were paying for Mrs. Whitehead's ser-
vices, they would have agreed to pay her some money "in the
event the child died before the fourth month," and they would
have agreed to pay her in full had the child been stillborn. Their
failure to agree to such a plan of compensation emphasizes that
they were paying for the baby, and not for Mrs. Whitehead's ser-
vices. 28 Justice Wilentz found this fact most disconcerting, and
123. In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. at 423, 537 A.2d at 1240.
124. It should be noted that each of the statutes to which Chief Justice Wilentz
refers are part of the adoption code of New Jersey. These were the very laws Judge Sorkow
chose not to use. In fact, Wilentz makes a point of saying, "[tihe [trial] court's ... analy-
sis of the surrogacy contract ... is not at all in accord with ours. The trial court con-
cluded that the various statutes governing this matter, including those concerning adoption,
termination of parental rights, and payment of money in connection with adoptions, [did]
not apply to surrogacy contracts." Id. at 418, 537 A.2d at 1238.
125. Id. at 423, 537 A.2d at 1240. This section of the statute is set forth as follows:
No person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or agency shall make, offer
to make or assist or participate in any placement for adoption and in connection
therewith (1) Pay, give or agree to give any money or any valuable considera-
tion, or assume or discharge any financial obligation; or (2) Take, receive, accept
or agree to accept any money or any valuable consideration.
Id. at n.4; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West 1976).
126. In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. at 423-24, 537 A.2d at 1240-41.
127. Id. at 424, 537 A.2d at 1241.
128. Id. Justice Wilentz was correct in noticing this aspect of the agreement. If a
couple truly believes it is paying for the services of the surrogate mother, they will compen-
sate her for her time and energy at every stage of the process. If the process ends early, she
should still recover for the services rendered up to that date. The New York bill, 1429-A,
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again emphasized that adoption laws prohibited this kind of pay-
ment. 29 The state of New Jersey would not tolerate this kind of
agreement; the risks were too great. 130 Under New Jersey Revised
Statute section 9:3-54a, the surrogacy contract could not stand.
According to Justice Wilentz, the surrogacy agreement also
conflicts' 3 ' with a private placement adoption statute, New Jersey
Revised Statute section 9:3-48c(1). 13 2 It states, "[iln order to ter-
minate parental rights under the private placement adoption stat-
ute, there must be a finding of 'intentional abandonment or a very
substantial neglect of parental duties without a reasonable expec-
tation of a reversal of that conduct in the future.' "'133 Clearly,
Mrs. Whitehead does not fall under any of these categories. She
did not abandon her child, nor did she mistreat her. To the con-
trary, she wanted to keep the child with her. In spite of this, the
trial court and the Sterns' counsel claimed she terminated her pa-
rental rights3 by virtue of a provision in the surrogacy con-
tract. 35 Justice Wilentz, however, found this provision of the con-
invokes such a rule and will be discussed more fully in section V of this Note. See also,
Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family". A Proposed Uniform Surrogate
Parenthood Act, 73 GEo. Li. 1283, 1309 (1985).
129. In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. at 425, 537 A.2d at 1241. "The prohibition of our
statute is strong. Violation constitutes a high misdemeanor ... a third degree crime...
[which carries] a penalty of three to five years imprisonment." Id.
130. Id.
The evils inherent in baby bartering are loathsome for a myriad of reasons. The
child is sold without regard for whether the purchasers will be suitable parents.
...The natural mother does not receive the benefit of counseling and guidance
to assist her in making a decision that may affect her for a lifetime. In fact, the
monetary incentive to sell her child may, depending on her financial circum-
stances, make her decision less voluntary.. . . Furthermore, the adoptive par-
ents may not be fully informed of the natural parents' medical history.
Id. (citations omitted).
131. The word "conflict" is used by Justice Wilentz in his opinion. Id. at 422, 537
A.2d at 1240.
132. Id. at 427, 537 A.2d at 1242.
133. Id. It should be noted that the arrangement between the Sterns and Mrs.
Whitehead is considered a private placement adoption because an adoption agency was not
involved in the process.
134. This is not surprising in light of the fact that Judge Sorkow did not believe the
adoption statutes should apply to this type of arrangement. Unlike Justice Wilentz, he
believed the agreement was a binding one. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
135. In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. at 429-30, 537 A.2d at 1244.
MARY BETH WHITEHEAD understands and agrees that in the best interest
of the child, she will not form or attempt to form a parent-child relationship
with any child or children she may conceive, carry to term and give birth to,
pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement, and shall freely surrender custody
to WILLIAM STERN, natural father, immediately upon birth of the child; and
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tract to be of no value. In his opinion, the termination of parental
rights is a serious matter, and the finality surrounding it is not to
be taken lightly by anyone.13 6 Illustrating that notion, the adop-
tion statutes require the "terminating parent" to meet several con-
ditions before he or she can sever the ties with his or her child. 3 7
In sum, Justice Wilentz stated that "[t]he Legislature would not
have so carefully, so consistently, and so substantially restricted
termination of parental rights if it had intended to allow termina-
tion to be achieved by one short sentence in a contract."'38 Thus,
the termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights was rendered
invalid by the supreme court. In light of this, Mrs. Stern could no
longer be regarded as the "mother" of Baby M, for "without a
valid termination there [could] be no adoption." 39 Consequently,
Mrs. Whitehead was to remain the mother of this child.1 40
In explaining the third reason for invalidating the surrogacy
contract, Justice Wilentz again described the painstaking mea-
sures necessary before terminating one's parental rights. He noted
that, in an agency situation:
"The surrender [of the child] must be in writing, must be in
such form as is required for the recording of a deed, and ...
must be such as to declare that the person executing [the cus-
tody document] desires to relinquish the custody of the child,
acknowledge[s] the termination of parental rights . . . and ac-
knowledge[s] full understanding of the effect of such surrender
." [to the agency] .141
In other words, the adoption statute requires informed con-
sent. Once this form has been accepted by the agency and meets
their satisfaction, the consent to surrender the child is irrevocable,
and there is no turning back. However, it is only irrevocable after
meeting these statutory requirements. In a private placement
adoption, Wilentz was quick to note, there are no statutory re-
quirements and "in an unsupervised private placement . . . there
is no statutory obligation to consent; [consequently,] there can be
terminate all parental rights to said child pursuant to this Agreement.
Id. at 470, 537 A.2d at 1244.
136. Id. at 425-26, 428, 537 A.2d at 1242-43.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 429, 537 A.2d at 1243-44.
139. Id. at 428, 537 A.2d at 1243 (citation omitted).
140. Id. at 429, 537 A.2d at 1244.
141. Id. at 431, 537 A.2d at 1244.
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no legal barrier to its retraction."" 2 "[C]onsent . . .is not only
revocable but, when revoked early enough, irrelevant.""'
In Wilentz's view, therefore, there is only one valid irrevoca-
ble consent, and that is not the consent Mary Beth Whitehead
gave in the contract. Irrevocable consent, under New Jersey law,
is "a consent to surrender . . . custody and a placement with an
approved agency [or youth service]." The consent must be con-
firmed by professionals, who attest that the party surrendering her
rights knows what she is doing. Mary Beth Whitehead's consent
did not meet these requirements. It was not given to an agency; it
was given in a contract. Further, "[c]ontractual surrender of pa-
rental rights is not provided for in [New Jersey] statutes as now
written." 5 Consequently, the court found the contractual consent
of Mary Beth Whitehead to be invalid.14 6
After explaining the legal grounds for invalidating the surro-
gacy contract, Justice Wilentz discussed the public policy reasons.
His major disagreement with the surrogacy contract, in terms of
public policy, revolved around the theory of "best interests of the
child." In his view, the child's best interests were being disre-
garded in a number of ways. First, the contract determined,
before the child's birth, which natural parent was to receive cus-
tody of the infant.4 The parents' needs were determined before
those of the child. Second, the agreement allowed for the "perma-
nent separation of the child from one of its natural parents.' 4 8 In
the court's opinion, it was never in the child's best interests to be
brought up by only one of its natural parents. 4 9 A relationship
142. Id. at 433, 537 A.2d at 1246 (citation omitted). The statutes regarding the
irrevocability of consent pertain to agencies and agency services. There is nothing on the
books, in terms of consent, regarding private placement adoptions.
143. Id. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246.
144. Id. The youth service referred to in Justice Wilentz's quote is the New Jersey
Division of Youth and Family Services, another state agency utilized in the placement of
children.
145. Id. at 433, 537 A.2d at 1245.
146. Id. at 434, 537 A.2d at 1246.
147. Id. Justice Wilentz asked how one could determine what is best for the baby
before she is born. "'[T]he ultimate determination of custody lies with the court in the
exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction as parens patriae.'" Id. at 435, 537 A.2d at 1246. In
his opinion, the court should decide, not the parents.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 435, 537 A.2d at 1246-47. It should be noted here that this author dis-
agrees with this statement. In a surrogate parenting situation, it is not good for the child to
remain in close contact with his surrogate mother. All it can amount to is confusion and
mixed emotions. Further, this author does not agree with the following statement made by
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with both parents is in the best interests of the child. Third, New
Jersey statutes do not allow one parent's right to the child to be
granted over the other parent's right. Each parent has an equal
right to the child.' 50 Fourth, there was a total disregard for the
mother/infant bond.'51 Finally, and "worst of all, .. . [t]here is
not the slightest suggestion [in the contract] that any inquiry will
be made at any time to determine the fitness of the Sterns as cus-
todial parents, of Mrs. Stern as an adoptive parent, [or] their su-
periority to Mrs. Whitehead .... ""' This last point is impor-
tant, for who is to say the contracting parties' intentions are good?
They could be child abusers, pornographers, or criminals. Without
a thorough investigation by qualified personnel, there is no way of
telling. In the court's opinion, public policy demands this type of
inquiry if the child's best interests are to be served.
In addition to these public policy arguments, 5 1 Justice Wi-
lentz also considered the arguments against surrogacy in general;
Justice Wilentz: "The impact of failure to follow that policy is nowhere better shown than
in the results of this surrogacy contract. A child, instead of starting off its life with as
much peace and security as possible, finds itself immediately in a tug-of-war between con-
tending mother and father." Id. at 435, 537 A.2d at 1247 (footnote omitted). This is un-
abashedly untrue. In most surrogacy situations, the child is not made the object of a tug-of-
war, nor should he be. Had this surrogacy contract been upheld, as it was at the trial level,
Baby M would not have become the subject of a tug-of-war either. The best interests of the
child may have been better provided for if the supreme court had accepted the surrogacy
contract.
150. Id. at 435-36, 537 A.2d at 1247.
151. Id. at 437, 537 A.2d at 1248. Justice Wilentz also referred to the mother/infant
bond:
[Sihe never makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any
decision prior to the baby's birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed,
and any decision after that, compelled by a pre-existing contractual commit-
ment, the threat of a lawsuit, and the inducement of a $10,000 payment, is less
than totally voluntary.
Id. In other words, public policy is also concerned with the welfare of the mother and her
wants and needs. The surrogacy contract, in the court's opinion, is contrary to public policy
for its failure to consider these aspects. In addition, Justice Wilentz noted that the natural
father and his wife are not protected by the surrogacy contract: "They know little about
the natural mother, her genetic makeup, and her psychological and medical history. More-
over, not even a superficial attempt is made to determine their awareness of their responsi-
bilities as parents." Id. As will be noted, in section V (B)(2) of this Note, this lack of
protection truly is against public policy. The key to success in these procedures is to obtain
as much information as possible about everyone involved. If the Sterns were able to learn
more about Mary Beth Whitehead, they probably would not have contracted with her to be
their surrogate and could have avoided the ensuing dilemma.
152. Id. This type of investigation is necessary if we are to make surrogacy a safe
alternative to infertility.
153. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
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the main objection was the profit motive of all involved: 1"4 "In the
scheme contemplated by the surrogacy contract in this case, a
middle man, propelled by profit, promotes the sale. Whatever ide-
alism may have motivated any of the participants, the profit mo-
tive predominates, permeates, and ultimately governs the transac-
tion.' 15  The surrogacy contract leads to the exploitation of all
parties.156 In essence, there are more bad results than good.
The second argument noted by Justice Wilentz was that
"surrogacy will be used for the benefit of the rich at the expense
of the poor.'1 57 His answer to this contention: "There are, in
short, values that society deems more important than granting to
wealth whatever it can buy, be it labor, love, or life.'1 58 Simply
because a poor woman voluntarily avails herself of this process
does not make it right.'59 Children cannot be bought.
Finally, and somewhat related to the profit element of this
procedure, is the court's concern over the "long-term effects of
surrogacy contracts." 6 0 Although they "are not known, [they are]
feared."'' By invalidating surrogacy contracts, the court perhaps
felt it could alleviate some of the problems surrogacy presents.
In light of all these concerns, Chief Justice Wilentz wrote
that, "the harmful consequences of this surrogacy arrangement
appear to us all too palpable. In New Jersey the surrogate
154. In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. 434-44, 537 A.2d at 1248-50.
155. Id. at 439, 537 A.2d at 1249.
156. Id. In short, the indigent woman who is in need of money will offer to be a
surrogate mother.
157. Id. In other words, as interpreted by a reporter from U.S. Law Week,
"[i]nfertile couples in the low-income bracket will be unable to utilize the process." "Baby
M" Stays with Sterns; Whitehead to Have Visitation, U.S. Law Week (BNA daily ed.),
Feb. 5, 1988.
158. In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. 440-41, 537 A.2d at 1249.
159. Id. at 441, 537 A.2d at 1250.
160. Id.
161. Id. The long-term effects to which Justice Wilentz refers are as follows:
[T]he impact on the child who learns her life was bought, that she is the off-
spring of someone who gave birth to her only to obtain money; the impact on the
natural mother as the full weight of her isolation is felt along with the full real-
ity of the sale of her body and her child; the impact on the natural father and
adoptive mother once they realize the consequences of their conduct.
Id.
It should also be noted that Alison Ward, former director and vice president of Con-
cerned United Birth Parents, stated that: "People say there aren't enough studies on the
children of surrogates or those born out of artificial insemination. Rather than go ahead
and permit surrogate parenting on that basis, why not wait until we know more about the
long term effects?" Zeldis, New York Seen Facing Delays on Surrogate Mother Measure,
N.Y.L.J., April 27, 1987, at 1, 4, col. 5. No doubt Justice Wilentz would agree.
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mother's agreement to sell her child is void. Its irrevocability in-
fects the entire contract, as does the money that purports to buy
it."'16 2 In short, surrogacy contracts are invalid in the state of New
Jersey.
After finishing with the contract issue, Justice Wilentz moved
on to other issues. Although he dedicated some time to the consti-
tutional issues raised by this procedure, 6 3 he concentrated most of
his efforts on the issues of custody164 and visitation. 65 In the
court's opinion, Baby M belonged in the custody of the Sterns:
There were eleven experts who testified concerning the
child's best interests, either directly or in connection with mat-
ters related to that issue. Our reading of the record persuades us
that the trial court's decision awarding custody to the Sterns
(technically to Mr. Stern) should be affirmed since "its findings
...could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible
evidence present in the record."' 6
Although it could be argued that the Sterns were the "ideal"
parents for this child, Chief Justice Wilentz clearly pointed out
that this decision was not reached in the same manner as at the
trial level.' 67 Instead of determining the custody issue on the basis
of a contractual remedy, as the trial court had done, the supreme
court chose to decide the issue of custody on a more traditional
basis-the "best interests of the child." Placement with the
Sterns, with their financial stability, strong marriage, and eager-
ness to nurture and protect the baby, was in the best interests of
this child.'6 8 It was merely coincidental that this result was the
same as that of Judge Sorkow."'6
162. In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. at 442-44, 537 A.2d at 1250.
163. Id. at 447-52, 537 A.2d at 1253-55.
164. Id. at 452-63, 537 A.2d at 1255-61.
165. Id. at 463-68, 537 A.2d at 1261-64.
166. Id. at 457, 537 A.2d at 1258 (citations omitted).
167. Id. at 454, 537 A.2d at 1256-57.
We note again that the trial court's reasons for determining what were the
child's best interests were somewhat different from ours. It concluded that the
surrogacy contract was valid, but that it could not grant specific performance
unless to do so was in the child's best interests. . . . While substantively indistin-
guishable from our approach to the question of best interests, the purpose of the
inquiry was not the usual purpose of determining custody, but of determining a
contractual remedy.
Id. at 454, 537 A.2d at 1256.
168. Id. at 458, 537 A.2d at 1259.
169. Id. at 459, 537 A.2d at 1259. "Based on all of this we have concluded, indepen-
dent of the trial court's identical conclusion, that Melissa's [Baby M] best interests call for
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After deciding the custody issue, Justice Wilentz moved on to
visitation. Although he and the court believed it would have been
in the best interests of the child to have terminated the proceed-
ings "once and for all,"170 it was their impression that the issue of
visitation was best left in the hands of the trial court.1M  There,
visitation could be dealt with on a more comprehensive level, and
if needed, experts could be recalled to testify on the matter.7 2
That visitation was granted is the important thing; that it was in
the child's best interests is another.' 73
In spite of what critics say, 7 4 New Jersey is not the only
state whose high court has addressed the matter of surrogacy. The
Supreme Court of Kentucky also spoke on the matter; although
the case did not involve a custody battle, it presents a most inter-
esting and persuasive argument in support of surrogate parenting.
C. The Supreme Court of Kentucky: On the Matter of
Surrogacy
In March of 1981, the Attorney General of Kentucky began
proceedings against Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. (SPA)
of Kentucky, "seeking to revoke SPA's corporate charter on
grounds of abuse and misuse of its corporate powers [which were]
detrimental to the interest and welfare of the state and its citi-
zens.' 7 5 How exactly did SPA "abuse and misuse its corporate
custody in the Sterns." Although, it should be noted, that the supreme court acknowledges
that this part of its decision was based on the trial court's analysis. Id. at 461, 537 A.2d at
1260.
170. Id. at 464, 537 A.2d at 1261-62.
171. Id. at 463-67, 537 A.2d at 1261-63.
172. Id. at 467, 537 A.2d at 1263.
173. When this Note was written, visitation rights had not yet been granted. Since
then, however, the trial court decided that liberal visitation rights should be extended to
Mary Beth Whitehead-Gould. In re Baby "M", 225 N.J. Super. 267, 269, 273-74, 542
A.2d 52, 53, 55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988). It was not, in this author's opinion, a wise
decision on Justice Wilentz's part to have granted visitation rights to Mrs. Whitehead. See
Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not So Novel After All, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct.
1983, at 28, 30. In this article Professor Robertson states that "[ihe greatest chance of
confusing family lines arises if the child and couple establish relations with the surrogate
and the surrogate's family." Id.
174. Hanley, Surrogate Deals for Mothers Held Illegal in Jersey, N.Y. Times, Feb.
4, 1988, at 1, col. 1. Robert Hanley said, "[b]ecause it is the nation's first ruling on surro-
gacy by a state's highest court, it is also expected to offer guidance to legislators and lower-
court judges grappling with the issue in other states." Id.
175. Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209,
210 (Ky. 1986).
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powers?" It seems as if SPA violated three Kentucky statutes.178
The most relevant was Kentucky Revised Statute section
199.590(2), which prohibits the purchase of a child for the pur-
pose of adoption.177 SPA operates a medical clinic which assists
infertile couples by means of surrogacy.'7 8 For its assistance in
these "transactions," the agency and the surrogate mother receive
a fee.179 Although the Circuit Court of Franklin County found
SPA's activities legal and dismissed the case, the court of appeals
found SPA's actions in violation of the aforementioned code. In
February of 1986, however, the Supreme Court of Kentucky over-
turned the court of appeals.' The supreme court held that SPA's
involvement in the surrogate parenting procedure was not to be
construed as a violation of Kentucky Revised Statute section
199.590.11 l How was the surrogate parenting procedure different
from "baby-selling"? Justice Liebson explained, that in his view it
was significantly different; Kentucky Revised Statute section
199.590 was intended to keep baby brokers from overwhelming
expectant mothers or the parents of a child with financial induce-
ments to part with the child. 182 With surrogate parenting, the
agreement to bear the child is entered into before conception.183
The surrogate mother is not facing the consequences of an un-
wanted pregnancy, or the fear of the financial burden of raising a
child.8 She is assisting a childless couple in attaining their ulti-
mate dream, a "biologically related" child. 8 5 Surrogate parent-
ing, Liebson explained, is not significantly different from Artificial
Insemination by Donor. In that case, a man donates his semen to
a woman whose husband is infertile. Yet no one accuses the attor-
neys, doctors, and biological fathers involved in this procedure of
violating the statute. 88 Indeed, why should those parties be
treated differently in a surrogacy situation? Justice Liebson an-
swers that they should not be. In addition, Justice Liebson noted,
as did Judge Sorkow in Baby M, that "'[b]ecause of the existence
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 210-11.
180. Id. at 214.
181. Id. at 211.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. (Please note, this is Justice Liebson's language.).
185. Id. at 211-12.
186. Id. at 212.
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of a legal relationship between the father and the child, any deal-
ing between the father and the surrogate mother in regard to the
child cannot properly be characterized as an adoption.' 18,7 Jus-
tice Liebson seems to have reiterated a key point: How can a fa-
ther adopt his own child? Stepparents can adopt, parents cannot.
All they can do is terminate their parental rights to the child, just
as the surrogate mother is supposed to do. However, what if she
chooses not to, and breaches the contract as Mrs. Whitehead did?
In that case, Kentucky treats surrogate contracts188 as voidable,
and "not per se illegal. 1 89 If the mother desires not to surrender
the child, she cannot be forced to by virtue of the contract.190 The
contract would be rendered void. We are now left with the mother
and the father of the child, each having parental rights as desig-
nated by pertinent statutes.191 In addition to these consequences,
Justice Liebson is quick to note that just as the adoptive mother
suffers a loss, so does the surrogate mother. For breaching the
contract, she must forfeit her rights to the fees she has been
promised.' 92
Justice Liebson concluded his opinion by saying that: "If
there are social and ethical problems in the solutions science of-
fers, these are problems of public policy that belong in the legisla-
tive domain, not in the judicial [domain] . . . . Short of such leg-
islation it is not for the courts to cut off solutions offered by
science."193 Unrestrained by statutory law on the issue of surro-
gate parenting, the court ruled as it saw fit. Surrogate parenting,
to this date, is not considered an illegal procedure in the state of
Kentucky.
Justice Liebson's reasoning is cogent. Despite the fact that
this case did not involve all the complexities of a custody fight
between a natural father and a surrogate mother, the Kentucky
Supreme Court makes an excellent argument for allowing surro-
gate parenting to continue. Justice Liebson considered the feelings
187. Id.
188. The court actually calls them "custody" contracts. But it can be inferred, from
the context in which the court refers to them, that Justice Liebson is talking about surro-
gacy contracts as custody contracts. Id. at 213.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. Although the court does not list the statutes it has in mind, it can be in-
ferred from the court's language that pertinent statutes would be those involving parental
rights of unwed couples.
192. Id.
193. Id.
1988-891
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
of both biological father and mother, the value of this new proce-
dure to the country's infertile, the voidable, as opposed to void,
nature of the surrogate contract, and the role the legislature must
play in this ever-evolving drama. In essence, he seems to adopt a
compromise between the Sorkow and Wilentz theories of how sur-
rogacy should be handled. Like Judge Sorkow, he does not apply
the adoption laws; and he renders the contracts voidable, as did
Justice Wilentz, recognizing that these contracts cannot automati-
cally take away a surrogate mother's custody rights. It is a thor-
ough analysis of surrogacy; indeed, one that is equally as thought-
ful and perhaps more humane, from the child's standpoint, than
Justice Wilentz's opinion in New Jersey.19 4
D. Current Case Law: Another Court's Answer to a Custody
Battle
Another recent case decided in a United States court in-
volves, what one reporter calls, a Solomon-like suggestion to the
ensuing surrogacy dilemma. 95 The case involved second cousins,
Ms. Munoz and Ms. Haro, who agreed to a joint-custody arrange-
ment for the child.196 Under California law, joint custody is the
preferred method to be utilized in custody disputes. In that case, a
woman was unwilling to surrender her child. Therefore, the judge
decided it was in both parties' interest to share the child.' 91 But,
neither the judgment nor result seem sound. The child will feel
confused and torn in his affection between the two parties; he will
not be able to decide which parent to go to in times of trouble or
to whom he owes his loyalty. For a judge to put a child in this
situation, where the parents were never married, seems unjust.
Unlike divorced couples, who initially share a bond together and
intend as well as expect to raise a child together, the natural fa-
ther and surrogate mother never intended such a relationship. To
make a child a party to this unusual union is unnatural, un-
194. But see Shipp, Decision Could Hinder Surrogacy Across Nation, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 4, 1988, at 14, col. 3. "Unlike the Baby "M" case, the Kentucky case did not involve
the litigation of the rights of the child and of the competing natural parents. For that
reason, the New Jersey case is likely to be given greater weight." Id.
195. Sherman, Surrogate Parenting Foes Applaud Baby M Ruling, Nat'l L.J.,
March 16, 1987, at 26, col. I. It should be noted that this is really not a Solomon-like
decision. Solomon's decision involved the belief that one of two women seeking custody of
the child was the true mother. The child was not shared between them.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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healthy, and unwise. It is also unrealistic to expect the youngster
to be able to cope with the problems arising from such a coupling.
The child should not be made a party to this dilemma.
E. The All-American Family?
Perhaps the strangest set of facts involving surrogacy oc-
curred when a daughter donated an egg for fertilization which
was then to be implanted into a surrogate so that her forty-six-
year-old mother could have a genetically-related child.19 Al-
though this is technically not a case, as it has not gone to trial, it
is a case study.199 The consulted physician sought the opinion of
experts on the matter. Lori Andrews, an attorney and project di-
rector at the American Bar Foundation, felt this type of arrange-
ment ought to be allowed.2"' Among the reasons she offered were:
one, it offers the opportunity of a genetically-related child; two, it
was not costly; three, the daughter can satisfy a feeling of altru-
ism; four, the child would have a more definite sense of identity;
and five, permitting this type of procedure would allow people to
make their own decisions regarding the family. 20 1 As to its utilita-
rian merits, Ms. Andrews believed that "a medical innovation is
adopted when it is anticipated to be an improvement over the ex-
isting treatment modalities and is unlikely to cause risks that out-
weigh its potential benefits. °202 As to being an improvement, not
enough is known about surrogacy to determine this of yet. Until
more data and research can be attained, Ms. Andrews infers that
careful counseling is required in these situations, and that these
procedures should be monitored so that the true values of surro-
gacy can be determined. 20 3 Even if one could agree with Ms. An-
drews, it must be noted that this case study involves relatives.
Opinions may change when this procedure is moved outside the
family. Our society may be more willing to accept these arrange-
ments within the family, but as the Munoz case showed, maybe
not. As all the previous cases and this case study point out, there
are no easy answers. This is a situation where legislation is needed
198. Andrews, When Baby's Mother is Also Grandma - and Sister, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Oct. 1985, at 29.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id at 30.
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but has yet to be seen.
F. The Absence of Legislation in America
A number of justices and critics agree that adoption laws are
not appropriate to govern surrogacy arrangements because adop-
tion and surrogacy are substantially different concepts2 04 As men-
tioned in Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc.,"°" the major dif-
ference is that in surrogacy there is a biological bond between the
father and child, which is not found in adoption. To outlaw surro-
gacy and deny a father access to his child by virtue of the fact
that it violates an adoption code seems more cruel than it would to
deny a stranger access to the child. In addition, it seems highly
unreasonable for judges or attorneys to believe that the surrogate
mother and the biological father can share custody of the child, in
the event the surrogate mother finds it impossible to part with the
infant at birth. In commercial instances, the surrogate and the fa-
ther are virtual strangers. Nothing links them together save the
child. If the woman breaches the contract, the father would be
expected to feel some animosity towards her, if not absolute ha-
tred. As previously mentioned, this could have an adverse effect on
the child.206
204. Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 1 (1986). In section C of her article, Ms. Katz distinguishes surrogate parent-
ing from black market baby-selling. She first notes that the adoption laws, which try to
prohibit black market baby-selling, were written before surrogate parenting came into exis-
tence, and therefore, should not apply. Id. at 18. Then she describes, in great detail, how
the activities of black market baby-selling and surrogate parenting are different. She sum-
marizes these differences:
Many of the primary dangers inherent in the black market situation do not ap-
ply to surrogate mother arrangements. The child will have a proper home, in
fact, the same one that he would have had if his parents had been able to con-
ceive naturally or adopt independently. The surrogate is not pressured to enter
into the agreement; she consents to the adoption voluntarily; the adoptive father
is the child's natural father; information about the child's mother is readily
available; the family unit is strengthened; and no other criminal activity is in-
volved. Other problems are either tempered or significantly less likely to occur.
An adopted child's feeling of abandonment is lessened when he lives with his
natural father. He may not feel that he was purchased if the payment is viewed
as for services. The problems of blackmail, auction-blocking, and the natural
mother's feelings of guilt are less likely to arise.
Id. at 24-25. Although Ms. Katz's discussion centers around black market baby-selling and
not adoption per se, it does show why adoption statutes, prohibiting the payment of money
for a child, should not apply to surrogate parenting.
205. See supra note 175.
206. See supra section III (C) of this Note.
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Another distinction drawn between surrogacy and adoption is
the issue set forth by Justice Liebson and Avi Katz-unwanted
versus wanted pregnancy. The former could lead to extortion
while the latter lends itself more to amicable bargaining. Assum-
ing adoption laws should not apply, the unanswered question is,
what should?
In addition to the previously-mentioned cases, which have ex-
pounded on the issue of surrogacy, there are bills being submitted
to various state legislatures on the issue.20 7 Of particular interest,
in light of the deluge of bills across the country and its timeliness
in relation to Baby I'M",208 is the bill introduced by New York
Republican senators John Dunne and Mary Goodhue. 09 Under
this bill, the major provisions of which were introduced in January
of 1987, surrogate contracts in the state of New York would be
recognized as legal and irrevocable.210 When a woman signs a
contract, she signs away all her rights to the child. 21  "The child
would be deemed at birth, the 'legitimate, natural child' of the
father and his wife." '2  In order for the contract to be legally
binding, the bill requires the contract to have the seal of judicial
approval before conception takes place.21 3 The reason for this re-
quirement is to ensure that all interested parties are aware of the
legal ramifications inherent in such an agreement. In addition, ju-
dicial review is imposed to prohibit unconscionable dealings be-
tween the parties.214 Also, the wife of the biological father must
be diagnosed "infertile. 21 5 Finally, the bill protects the surrogate
mother's constitutional right to have an abortion.216
Another bill, introduced by Democrat Patrick Halpin, would
207. It should be noted here that one anti-surrogacy bill has been passed by the state
of Nebraska. This bill declares surrogate motherhood contracts void. Janson, Panel Backs
Curbs on Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1988, at B28, col. 6. For a thorough
analysis of all the state bills across the country see Andrews, The Aftermath of Baby M:
Proposed State Laws on Surrogate Motherhood, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct.-Nov. 1987,
at 31.
208. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987), arid in part, rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1127 (1988).
209. Kolbert, New York State Senators Introduce Bill to Uphold Surrogate Con-
tracts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1987, at B2, col. 4.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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render all surrogate contracts which pay in excess of the medical
costs illegal.21 In addition, and similar to adoption, the surrogate
mother would be given twenty days to reconsider surrendering the
child. 18 In reference to these provisions, Mr. Halpin stated that
"[t]his recognizes that surrogate motherhood is not a business
deal." 219
The choice by both Republican and Democratic legislators to
approach the problem of surrogacy under the auspices of contract
law is interesting and thought-provoking. One might ask, however,
whether this is the best approach to surrogacy. Perhaps the wiser
choice is to consider the issues of surrogate parenting under an-
other body of law, as Justice Wilentz did,220 or under the parens
patriae theory espoused by Judge Sorkow. 21 In light of the fact
that surrogate parenting is a unique and problematic procedure,
one body of law may not be enough; perhaps the solution lies in a
combination of legal theories. These questions will be dealt with
more fully in the latter portion of this Note.222
G. Ethical and Legal Problems Unresolved in America
To some, surrogate parenting is seen as a form of adultery
and a most unnatural form of procreating.223 In fact many believe
that the child born of surrogacy is illegitimate because the child's
parents are not married. For others, surrogate parenting is nothing
less than baby-selling. To them it is contrary to public policy to
rent one's womb for profit. As one critic said, "no one believes for
a minute that these women don't do it for the money. If you want
to test that, just take away the money. '224 The fact that surro-
gates are paid $10,000 for a live birth and $1,000 for a still birth
merely seems to emphasize this point. 25
217. Kolbert, Baby M Adds Urgency to Search For Equitable Laws, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 15, 1987, at E22, col. 2.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
221. Shipp, Parental Rights Law, N.Y. Times, April 8, 1987, at B2, col. 1. Com-
mentator Dr. Doris Jonas Freed, a specialist in matrimonial law, noted "that Judge Sorkow
was not bound by the New Jersey family-law statutes in the surrogacy case and that he
had acted properly in fashioning new law under the parens patriae theory- a centuries old
principle that empowers the state to look after the interests of children . Id.
222. See infra section V of this Note.
223. Keane, supra note 1, at 149.
224. Surrogacy = Baby Selling, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1987, at 38, 38.
225. Rifkind, Surrogacy Is Wrong; It Must Be Outlawed, USA Today, Sept. 3,
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Noel Keane, the man who introduced surrogacy in this coun-
try and negotiated the Baby "M" deal, would disagree with the
aforementioned contentions. In his opinion, pregnancy and child-
birth are hazardous, time-consuming, painful conditions which
few women can be expected to experience for the sake of someone
else unless they receive meaningful compensation.226 It is a bur-
densome task to carry a child. In addition, one could argue that in
becoming pregnant, the surrogate has sacrificed her ability to
work outside the home; in essence her pregnancy becomes a job.
Why shouldn't she be compensated?
Putting these matters aside, it is still imperative to emphasize
that no matter what ethical dilemmas surround this procedure,
there are significant legal problems to be considered. Unless a
court has ruled on the matter, most people, lawyers and laymen
alike, will not know if they are committing a crime, or entering a
fruitless pursuit. Some courts may deem the contracts unenforce-
able. To grant specific performance in the wrong situation, i.e.,
where the mother is better suited to take care of the child, would
be in the child's worst interest. In addition, Mr. Cassidy, the law-
yer for Mary Beth Whitehead, noted:
[T]he contract seeks to effectuate abandonment of a baby by a
mother. Her refusal to abandon her child and fulfill her obliga-
tion should be supported by the courts because it conforms with
behavior we seek to advance or promote. The court should not
be used as the court below [Judge Sorkow's court] was on May
5, 1986 to advance or promote behavior contrary to our policy
against abandonment and improvident separations.22
Mr. Cassidy makes a valid point which should be taken into seri-
ous consideration when deciding whether or not to specifically en-
force a contract.
IV. THE PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY SURROGACY
A. Great Britain and America
Great Britain and the United States are bound by their com-
mon concern over the same legal and moral dilemmas. Those op-
posed to surrogacy believe that "[t]he surrogate mother provides
1987, at 8A, col. 5.
226. Keane, supra note 1, at 153.
227. Cassidy, What Is in Baby M's "Best Interest" and What Standard Should Ap-
ply?, NEw Li., Oct. 26, 1987, at 19, col. 4.
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her ovum, and enters into a surrogate mother arrangement, with
the clear understanding that she is to avoid responsibility for the
life she creates. . . . [H]er desire to create a child is born of some
motive other than the desire to be a parent."22 It might be money
she desires, or it might be a form of catharsis for the surrogate
who desires to rid herself of the guilt of aborting an earlier preg-
nancy. 229 Either way, the critics believe surrogacy to be unnatural.
"[C]reating a child without desiring it fundamentally changes the
way we look at children-instead of viewing them as unique indi-
vidual personalities to be desired in their own right, we may come
to view them as commodities or items of manufacture to be de-
sired because of their utility. '230 This fear of a surrogacy "assem-
bly line" ultimately plays out in a situation where a child born of
surrogacy later meets his half-sister and falls in love with her.23'
Although the likelihood of this is slim, the opponents of surrogacy
fear for the worst and to them there is no rationalizing away these
fears.
To the British, the commercial exploitation of infertility is
unacceptable, as is surrogacy for convenience alone.232 Yet, the
Warnock Committee only voiced some of Britain's concerns. Per-
haps what angered people most, however, was Kim Cotton's overt
sale of the rights to her story to the British press, and her remark-
able ability to exploit the surrogacy procedure. The fact that she
would sell the rights to this sordid tale (as it was viewed in Brit-
ain) merely exemplified the commerciality of this procedure. 23 3
In addition to their common moral outlook, the British and
Americans also recognize a need for comprehensive legislation.
For example, in Britain it was said that "[in its desire to legislate
quickly Parliament has avoided all the major issues relating to
surrogacy. The Act is silent with respect to the position of the
child, surely the most important and vulnerable person in the
transaction. It ignores the questions of legitimacy and
parenthood .... 1234 The fact that an amendment has already
been proposed for the Surrogacy Arrangements Act emphasizes
228. Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate Parenting, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Oct. 1983, at 35, 35.
229. Kantrowitz, Who Keeps "Baby M?", NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 44, 47.
230. Krimmel, supra note 228, at 36-37.
231. Id. at 38.
232. THE REPORT, supra note 17, at 46.
233. Harding, supra note 5, at 39.
234. Sloman, supra note 15, at 980.
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this Act's weaknesses.
"It's the absence of laws [in America] that creates the
problems. 235 To remedy these problems requires clear and en-
forceable laws. These laws would determine who may be surrogate
mothers, and who will hire them. They would mandate supervi-
sion of the agencies handling these procedures and the individuals
who make the arrangements, and protect the rights of those in-
volved so the likelihood of a Baby "M" reoccurrence is substan-
tially diminished.236 Although the United States does not have
legislation similar to the Surrogacy Arrangements Act on its
books, an example of the possible problems are seen in a recent
bill proposed in California.237 The bill was presented and passed
by the state assembly but died in the Senate. The bill required
surrogate mothers to be at least twenty-one years of age and to
have already had a child.2 8 In addition, it insisted on extensive
medical testing for all the parties involved. 3 9 Finally, the bill re-
quired that money paid to the surrogate be considered compensa-
tion for services rather than payment for the infant.240 The bill
was opposed by Catholic organizations, feminist groups, and the
American Civil Liberties Union.241 A Missouri legislator admira-
bly summed up why America is so reluctant to accept an immedi-
ate solution: "There's a natural disinclination to pass new ideas
quickly . . .. But we have to back up and let our law catch up
with our science. By not deciding, it turns out that we are
deciding."2 42
B. Differences Between the Countries
Perhaps of greatest significance is Britain's eagerness to ap-
pease its public at once. As soon as the social upheaval following
Baby Cotton came to a head, the British government hurried to
draft legislation. In some instances, however, no law is better than
bad law. In addition to analyzing the amendment to the Act as an
235. Surrogacy Can Work, But Laws are Needed, USA Today, Sept. 3, 1987, at 8A,
col. 1.
236. Id.
237. Kolbert, Baby M Adds Urgency to Search for Equitable Laws, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 15, 1987, at 22, col. 2.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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exemplification of its weaknesses, the amendment also illustrates
one of the government's strengths-its ability to recognize its
weaknesses and its speed in rectifying them.
Granted, the United States is a much larger country, with a
diverse populace and varying traditions, both social and religious,
and certainly it would take a greater length of time to reach a
consensus. But this debate on surrogacy has continued for a num-
ber of years. Doe v. Kelley, the first case in America involving
surrogate parenting, was decided in 1981.243 As a consequence of
this failure to reach a concensus, our judges are forced to adjudi-
cate in areas normally left to the legislatures. As Justice Latey
pointed out in his Baby Cotton opinion, these ethical and moral
dilemmas belong in the hands of the legislature. Although Judge
Sorkow attempted to adjudicate a just result, 4 judicial authority
is not enough to solve this problem. Guidance and wisdom are
needed to give the strength and backbone required for a trial
judge's decision. It is possible Mary Beth Whitehead would not
have appealed this case if there was a statute on the books requir-
ing the surrender of the child to the Sterns in the first place.
V. SURROGACY: WHAT TO Do
There is no denying that surrogacy presents problems. The
surrogate mother could renege on the contract; the adoptive
couple could prove to be less than ideal parents; and the child
could later resent being purchased, as one would purchase a
car. 2 45 To outlaw surrogacy outright, however, is not the answer.
Surrogate parenting is a legitimate alternative reproductive pro-
cess, and one worthy of acceptance. To some infertile couples it is
the only available procedure through which they may have a bio-
logically-related child. 46 As a society, we should encourage this
value of "family," not discourage it. As Gary N. Skoloff, attorney
243. See Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
244. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987), aft'd in part, rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
245. Katz, supra note 204, at 20. "[T]he uncomfortableness or high expectations
that result from having been paid for are likely to remain unless the child can be convinced
that he was not bought . I..." d. (footnote omitted).
246. Keane, supra note 1, at 155. "Surrogate motherhood is different. A married
couple desiring a child which the wife is incapable of bearing herself enters into the ar-
rangement, not to 'buy' a biologically-unrelated baby, but to bring a child into existence by
conscious prearrangement which is, as far as biologically possible, their 'own.'"
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for the Sterns, said,
It must be recognized that surrogacy arrangements create
life and families in circumstances where they are not otherwise
possible. This creation of new life is in accordance with society's
respect for life and its respect and reverence for the family unit.
The arrangement between the surrogate mother and the natural
father emphasizes the worth of children in our society and
brings the unique experience of parenthood to those who other-
wise would be deprived of it.247
The better argument, as opposed to prohibition, is to regulate
surrogacy. Place some limitations on the process and erect some
hoops that agencies and lawyers alike will have to jump through
before these agreements are recognized and upheld. The focus of
this Note now shifts to how we are to accomplish this regulatory
scheme. As already mentioned, Britain provides us with one
model: the Surrogacy Arrangements Act. However, this may be a
prime example of what not to do.
A. The Surrogacy Arrangements Act: A Poor Model
Although it does away with the primary evil of surrogacy,
commercialism and commercial agencies,248 the Act does not pre-
vent private arrangements from being made. 49 Men and women,
considering entering into a surrogate contract, may still do so
without the aid of counsel or medical professionals. This is not in
either party's best interest. The potential surrogate, especially if
she has not had children, cannot be fully informed, and thus will
be incapable of giving informed consent to the procedure. The
hopeful father, without the aid of legal counsel, will not be able to
protect his legal interests should the surrogate choose to later
breach the contract.2 50 The unborn child, should either of the
aforementioned parties be a carrier of a sexually transmitted dis-
ease, could also be adversely affected. In addition, voluntary ar-
rangements are not always the best answer. For those who wish to
keep contact between the surrogate and the adopting family to a
247. Skoloff & O'Donnell, Is Surrogate Parenting the 'Cure' for Society's Infertility
'Epidemic'?, 10 NEw L. 18, 18 (1987). However, one could say this view merely encour-
ages vanity. In light of the fact that most of society wants biologically-related children,
however, this argument does not hold much weight.
248. Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, ch. 49, § 2.
249. Id. § 2(2)(a)-(b). See also Brahams, supra note 62, at 17.
250. See generally Sloman, supra note 15, at 979-80; supra section 11 (C) of this
Note.
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
minimum, agency arrangements would be preferred. 5 In an
agency setting, the contracting party could select a surrogate
mother without meeting her face to face. Their anonymity would
be preserved, for whatever reason, and the surrogate mother
would also be able to distance herself from the couple. Because no
emotional ties between the parties have been encouraged, a busi-
ness-like quality is maintained throughout the procedure. When it
comes time to surrender the infant, the surrogate mother, theoreti-
cally, will do so in a business-like fashion.2 52 This argument does
not propose that voluntary arrangements are always a bad alter-
native, in many instances they are not. Some couples may enjoy
having contact with their surrogate, and vice versa. 53 Others en-
joy keeping the surrogate relationships in the family.254 However,
a problem with Britain's Act is that it gives a couple few alterna-
tives in choosing the arrangement. In an arrangement as personal
as surrogacy, there must be a choice.
In light of the vague terms embodied in the Act, the fact that
it also allows for noncommercial arrangements is of little conse-
quence. As Ms. Susan Sloman notes, "[a]lthough some counsel-
ling facilities are provided by the NHS [National Health Service],
local authorities and voluntary organisations, there is a danger
that the uncertainty surrounding [section 2] may lead to 'ama-
251. See also Brahams, supra note 62; but see Callahan, Surrogate Motherhood: A
Bad Idea, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at A25, cols. 2-5.
252. But see Callahan, supra note 251, at A25, col. 2. Mr. Callahan would respond
to this argument:
No less importantly, by the patent need to screen out women with the sensibili-
ties of Mary Beth Whitehead we introduce as destructive a notion as can be
imagined: a cadre of women whose prime virtue is what we now take to be a
deep vice-that bearing of a child one does not want and is prepared not to love.
...Even if, as suggested, the commercialization of surrogacy were banned, that
would only partly address this problem. There would still be the need to find
women with the capacity thoroughly to dissociate and distance themselves from
their own child. This is not a psychological trait we should want to foster, even
in the name of altruism.
Id.
253. Peterson, Baby M Case Stirs Feelings of Surrogate Mothers, N.Y. Times,
March 2, 1987, at B1, col. 3. "Peggy Pressler of Canton, Ohio arranged in advance that
she would be able to have occasional visits with Adam, the baby she bore for a California
couple in July 1985 .... The relationship Mrs. Pressler developed with the couple . ..
appears to be unusual because it is [a] continuing [one]." Id.
254. The first case that comes to mind is the well-publicized case in South Africa,
where a mother gave birth to triplets for her infertile daughter. Cover story, PEOPLE, Oct.
19, 1987, at 38.
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teurish or exploitive do-it-yourself arrangements.' ",255 Conse-
quently, general facilities are not the answer, as the minority of
the Warnock Committee noted.256 Licensed agencies specializing
in surrogacy and meeting certain minimum requirements are the
answer. The Act does not require noncommercial agencies to be
licensed.
Perhaps the one virtue of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act is
that it does not prohibit surrogacy outright. Yet, the- manner in
which surrogacy is permitted to continue is unsatisfactory. Ban-
ning commercial transactions alone is simply not enough; if any-
thing it worsens the situation by leaving the procedure in the
hands of amateurs. A lesson the United States can learn from the
British is that drafting this kind of legislation cannot be done
hastily. Every step of the surrogacy process must be carefully con-
sidered and every party to the transaction regarded. 257 If the
United States is going to permit surrogacy arrangements to con-
tinue, as Britain has, it must regulate them and prohibit the pub-
lic or unlicensed agencies from preparing these agreements by
themselves. In other words, the state should set up the guidelines
under which the parties considering surrogacy are to operate. In
choosing not to incorporate various recommendations made by the
Warnock Committee, Parliament deprived this Act of the sub-
stance it badly needs. 58
B. The Substance
1. What Britain Can Offer
The Warnock Committee made several recommendations and
comments worthy of notice and implementation in future surro-
gate parenting legislation. To begin with, we should reconsider
section 8.17, which states as follows:
In the first place we are all agreed that surrogacy for conve-
255. Sloman, supra note 15, at 980 (footnote omitted).
256. Id.
257. A prime example of a piece of legislation covering every aspect of the surrogacy
process is the New York State Dunne Bill, which is discussed in section V(B)(2) of this
Note.
258. The substance this Act needs is mentioned in section V(B)(1). The sections of
the Warnock Report, from the majority opinion, that would give this Act substance are
sections 8.18 and 8.19 which are stated in full in section 11(B) of this Note. They are the
recommendations to outlaw surrogacy completely, thus leaving no gaps through which to
negotiate and rendering all such contracts illegal.
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nience alone, that is, where a woman is physically capable of
bearing a child but does not wish to undergo pregnancy, is to-
tally [and] ethically unacceptable. . . . That people should treat
others as a means to their own ends, however desirable the con-
sequences, must always be liable to moral objection.259
Surrogacy for convenience's sake, and convenience's sake
alone, is a reprehensible idea. To advocates and adversaries of sur-
rogacy alike, it is a most undesireable arrangement. Not only does
it undermine the primary function of surrogate parenting, ena-
bling those who cannot have children to have them, it also encour-
ages the commercial aspect of the process. That the Surrogacy
Arrangements Act does not prohibit this kind of an arrangement
once again demonstrates its weaknesses.260 It should be made
clear, in any future legislation, that only couples who have been
diagnosed as infertile should be permitted to utilize this process,
and only as a last resort.26 ' This qualification would ensure that
surrogacy's primary purpose is not undermined, and the process is
not abused.
The arguments set forth by the Warnock minority are also
worthy of attention, particularly the minority's opinion that surro-
gate parenting is here to stay.26 2 Although there will always be
those who are opposed or ready to abuse the process,263 we should
make every effort to make the procedure safe for those who need
it. In the minority's opinion, non-profit organizations could pro-
vide the answer.26 4 With the advent of licensing requirements265
and regulations,66 surrogate parenting could become a safe proce-
dure, free of the dangers of do-it-yourself arrangements:
Our colleagues, by their recommendation in paragraph 8.18
259. THE REPORT, supra note 17, at 46.
260. This conclusion refers to the potential for baby-selling, means/ends argument.
We should never allow fertile women to use others to have their babies. This is exploitation
of women at its worst.
261. The Dunne bill makes it mandatory for a couple to be infertile before utilizing
the surrogacy process. This bill is discussed in section V(B)(2).
262. THE REPORT, supra note 17, at 88. This is part of the dissent.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 88, comment five.
265. Id. This part of comment 5 states, "[w]e believe that the licensing authority
• . . should include surrogacy within its remit. The authority would have the power to
license an agency or agencies to make arrangements for surrogacy." Id.
266. Id. The part referred to in the text says, "[t]hese arrangements would include
the matching of commissioning parents with surrogate mothers, and the provision of ade-
quate counselling to ensure that legal and personal complications of surrogacy were fully
understood." Id.
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would prevent gynaecologists from offering any form of assis-
tance to such couples to achieve a surrogate pregnancy. As a
consequence couples may give up any hope of a child, may take
further risks such as . . .more miscarriages, or may decide to
venture into some sort of 'do-it-yourself' arrangement. The latter
possibility-that couples are driven into making their own ar-
rangements-is particularly unsatisfactory. These arrangements
would be unsupported by [the] medical and counselling services
• ..that the Inquiry has recommended ....'11
Licensing would require organizations to provide medical,
counselling, and child care services.268 If the notion of "profit" is
totally abhorrent to some states, but the procedure of surrogacy is
not, profit can be eliminated without sacrificing these necessities.
In addition, the minority's consideration of the surrogate's ex-
pectation of pay is to be commended. 6 9 Not only does the minor-
ity concede that this form of profit cannot be eliminated, it also
stresses that present adoption statutes, with their prohibition of
payment, should not stand in the way of the commissioning
couple's adoption of the child.170 The minority opinion states:
"[I]f steps are taken to regularise surrogacy through licensing,
some form of adoption procedure must be open to couples. 2 71 The
wholesale application of adoption laws to surrogacy is misplaced,
because the "adopting" father is the "natural" father of the child.
Some aspects of adoption law, however, may be adaptable, e.g.,
the emphasis on the "best interests of the child." However, careful
consideration is necessary in this adaptation.
The Warnock Committee Report has much to offer, and Par-
liament may benefit from its wisdom upon consideration of the
pending amendment to the Surrogacy Arrangements Act. Ameri-
can legislators, however, should not wait for the British Amend-
ment but should incorporate some, if not all, of the aforemen-
tioned recommendations into any pending state bills to ensure
well-considered and comprehensive statutes are enacted.
267. Id. at 88, comment 4. Section 8.18 would outlaw surrogacy outright. Id. at 46-
47.
268. Id. at 88, comment 5. The comment states in part that "[t]he only agencies
which could be licensed would be those in which child-caring skills were well represented
.. Id.
269. Id. at 89, comment 7.
270. Id. The relevant portion of this comment states, "[i]n our opinion payments to a
surrogate mother should not be a barrier to the child being adopted by the commissioning
couple." Id.
271. Id.
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2. New York's Contribution: The Model Bill
What some critics refer to as the "model bill ''2 72 is known to
New York legislators simply as bill 1429-A, or the "Dunne
bill."'273 If enacted, it would legalize surrogacy contracts, abolish
the need for adoption proceedings, and allow surrogate mothers to
receive payment for their services. It is a comprehensive piece of
legislation and worthy of passage in New York. It is also a valua-
ble resource for those states still undecided on the matter of surro-
gate parenting. It not only provides solutions to problems already
presented, but it also provides solutions to those which have yet to
occur.
The bill begins simply by stating:
The legislature finds that due to the increased incidence of fe-
male infertility, many couples are turning to surrogate mothers
to help them create families.
[A]n individual's decision regarding whether or not to bear
or beget a child should fall within the protected rights of pri-
vacy, and, therefore, the state may not prohibit the practice of
surrogate parenting or enact regulations [which would prohibit
it].
The legislature further determines that the legal status of
children born under surrogate parenting arrangements is cur-
rently uncertain. .... [T]he legislature must act to fill the legal
void surrounding the practice of surrogate parenting. 4
Declaring surrogate parenting "constitutional," by virtue of
the "protected rights of privacy," is not enough. 27 15 As this bill's
272. Zeldis, supra note 161, at 1, col. 3. This comment about bill 1429-A "being
eyed as a model bill across the country" was made by H. Joseph Gitlin, chairman of the
Adoption Committee of the American Bar Association's section of Family Law. Id. at I,
col. 4.
273. S. 1429-A, 1987-1988 Regular Session, New York (Feb. 3, 1987) [hereinafter
The Dunne Bill] (the Republican bill drafted by New York senators Mary Goodhue and
John Dunne). See also supra section III (E).
274. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 1.
275. Id. Although the bill does not indicate where the constitutional right to procre-
ate originates, an interview conducted by the American Bar Association did result in an
answer. Life, Liberty and Children, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1987, at 39. This is an interview with
John Robertson, a professor of law at the University of Texas, Austin. When asked by the
Journal why surrogate agreements should be enforced Professor Robertson answered,
"[b]ecause there is a constitutional right of infertile couples to reproduce by noncoital
means that extends to the use of surrogates. This means that the state cannot criminally
ban either the use of surrogate arrangements or the payment of money to surogates." Id. at
39. When asked where this constitutional right originates, Professor Robertson replied,
The basis is the right of married couples to reproduce. Roe v. Wade and the
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introduction illustrates, surrogate parenting presents many issues;
constitutionality is only one. In order for surrogacy to be accepted,
as this bill indicates, state legislatures must ensure the following:
(1) the child born has a permanent home and settled rights; (2)
the rights and responsibilities of the intended parents, as well as
the surrogate and her husband are clearly delineated; (3) the risk
to all parties is kept to a bare minimum; (4) the use of this proce-
dure is limited to those who really need it; (5) the risk of exploita-
tion and coercion is minimized; and (6) informed consent must be
obtained in all these circumstances. 7 6 The key to successful legis-
lation is to provide solutions to problems. Now, what are the
solutions?
To begin with, the Dunne bill defines an "infertile woman" as
one who has not conceived after twelve months of infertility treat-
ment;277 one who has been diagnosed as incapable of conceiving a
child without risk to her life/health, or that of her child's; or one
who is sterile.27 A woman who does not fit the above description,
cannot utilize the surrogacy process. In this way, New York pro-
hibits the use of surrogacy as a means of convenience. As already
indicated, this is a crucial public policy matter.279 In defining the
surrogate mother as a "woman of twenty-one years or older,"' 0
the bill also eliminates the possibility of the exploitation of minors.
contraceptive cases have clearly established the right of a person not to
reproduce. Many cases contain dicta suggesting the right to reproduce would
also be recognized. Obviously, this right extends to infertile couples, because the
basic values-the importance and meaning of children-are the same. The fact
that a couple is infertile doesn't change the nature of their interest. It's just
more difficult for them to achieve it.
Id.
276. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 1.
277. Infertility treatments generally consist of an examination of a man's and a wo-
man's reproductive organs. For the male this means conducting a sperm analysis; for the
woman it means a thorough examination of the cervix, uterus, and fallopian tubes, in order
to determine if these organs are functioning properly. In surrogate parenting, it is only the
woman's infertility with which we are faced. If the woman's organs are not functioning
properly, because there is a congenital abnormality or the fallopian tubes are damaged, and
the situation is incapable of being solved medically or physically, by in vitro fertilization,
the woman is declared infertile. For an explanation of the in vitro fertilization process, see
OLsoN & ALEXANDER, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER 21-34 (1986).
278. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 119(1).
279. Foster, Surrogate Parenting: The New York Proposal, N.Y.L.J. Feb. 17, 1987,
at 2, col. 1. This article states that "[a] wife who merely wants to avoid the 'inconvenience'
[sic] of pregnancy and childbirth would not be eligible for the procedure. Otherwise, it is
assumed, the surrogate-parenting procedure would result in the commercialization and ex-
ploitation of human reproduction." Id.
280. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 119(3).
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Surrogate parenting is a complex procedure and requires mature
decision-making on the part of all parties. Minors, as generally
recognized, are incapable of rendering this kind of a decision and
thus should be prohibited from entering into this type of agree-
ment. As for those who do not believe that any woman is capable
of giving informed consent to this procedure, the Dunne bill at-
tempts to alleviate those doubts.
Section 121 states that, "[a]ny agreement to accomplish the
purposes of a surrogate parenting agreement as defined in section
one hundred nineteen of this article, which does not receive judi-
cial approval .. .shall be deemed null and void and shall not
have any force or effect in this state."'"
The bill attempts to resolve all issues before pregnancy and
delivery of the baby occurs, by requiring a judicial seal of ap-
proval on all agreements.2 a2 If the judge is not satisfied and finds
that one step of the process has not been met, the couple and sur-
rogate either must begin again or head to another state. To some,
the requirement of prior judicial approval may be so intimidating
that it discourages them from attempting to participate in the sur-
rogacy process. But those who are interested and continue read-
ing, soon find comfort. Instead of making the process incredibly
difficult, the Dunne bill makes it simple by describing in minute
detail what each party must do to satisfy the judge.
Step one entails the creation of a surrogacy contract which
includes all items listed in section 122 of the bill.2 3 Among those
items are the surrogate's agreement to be artificially inseminated,
to carry the child, and to relinquish the infant immediately after
birth.284 The parents stipulate that they will accept the child re-
gardless of its health or physical condition.285 In addition, while
281. Id. § 121.
282. See Foster, supra note 279, at 2, col. 3. The exact language used in this article
reads as follows: "The procedure proposed for New York would have the advantage of
resolving such issues before pregnancy and delivery of the baby." Id.
283. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 122.
284. See Zeldis, supra note 161, at 4, col. 5. In this article, John McArdle, Senator
Dunne's spokesperson, stated that "'[c]entral to the contract provision is that there be a
clear understanding that at birth the surrogate mother relinquishes all legal rights to the
child, but prior to the birth she has full control of the pregnancy .... ' " Id. In other
words, a central provision of the contract is that which commits the surrogate mother to
surrender her child at the end of the pregnancy. It is not intended that the surrogate is to
believe that she can waive this clause at a later date.
285. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 122(l)(c). This is not to say that the
intended parents may not later give the child up for adoption. To remedy this problem,
however, would require much regulation and change, in light of the fact that any parent
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the surrogate is given absolute control over medical decisions,2"6
the intended parents agree to bear all reasonable medical costs
incurred by the surrogate mother28 7 and to provide term life and
health insurance for the surrogate."88 The amount of compensa-
tion for the surrogate is to be set forth in the contract and depos-
ited in an escrow account for further dispensation."5 9 Both the
natural father and the surrogate mother must agree to undergo
medical examinations for sexually transmitted diseases and geneti-
cally detectable diseases for protection of the unborn child.2 90 The
results of these medical tests must be made available to all par-
ties.2" Any contractual provision which conditions compensation
on the health, viability, or survival of the child is to be stricken
from the text and rendered void. 2  Further, it must be stipulated
that any cause of action arising from such an agreement is to be
limited to an action for breach of contract, surrender of the child,
or both.293 Finally, the surrogate mother is to be provided legal
counsel of her own choosing to be used during the negotiation pro-
could give his handicapped child up for adoption. The inability to accept handicapped chil-
dren is a societal problem and far beyond the scope of this Note. See also, Robertson,
Surrogate Mothers: Not So Novel After All, HASTINGS CENrER REP., Oct. 1983, at 28,
32.
286. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 122(l)(d). Nothing in this section of the
bill prohibits the surrogate mother from smoking or drinking. See infra section V(B)(3) of
this Note, where this recommendation is made.
287. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 122(1)(e). It should be noted that, as of
yet, surrogacy remains a procedure that can be utilized only by those who are wealthy
enough to afford it. Chief Justice Wilentz stated in his opinion, in In re Baby "M', that
"we doubt that infertile couples in the low-income bracket will find upper income surro-
gates." In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. 396, 440, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (1988). In reponse to
Justice Wilentz's criticism, however, John Robertson might respond that "it is not unjust to
poor couples, for it does not leave them worse off than they were." Robertson, supra note
285, at 29. Although Professor Robertson's statement seems a bit harsh, it is realistic. In a
society that values money as highly as ours, there really is not much we can do to remedy
this problem. For the time being, surrogacy will remain a process for those who can afford
it.
288. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 122(l)(f).
289. Id. § 122(l)(g).
290. Id. § 122(l)(h)-(i).
291. Id. § 122(l)(k).
292. Id. § 122(1)0).
293. Id. § 122(l)(1). It should be noted that this means that the surrogate mother
surrenders all rights to the child before birth; thus doing away with the need for adoption
after the child is born. The Dunne bill proposes a new way of handling surrogacy, separate
and apart from the adoption code. As Henry Foster, Jr. and Doris Jonas Freed noted, "[iut
is concluded that since no adoption is involved in the recommended procedure, and that
since informed consent is required before insemination and conception, existing adoption
statutes have no application." Foster, supra note 279, at 2, col. 2.
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cess. 94 This provision of the contract also prohibits the parties
from retaining the same counsel and is designed as a protective
measure for the surrogate mother.29 5 The costs of such counsel are
to be paid by the intended parents.296
The next step in the process involves the filing of the petition.
Section 123 of the Dunne bill requires a verified petition for judi-
cial approval of the surrogacy contract to be filed by the intended
parents in the appropriate court.2  In addition, it requires the in-
tended parents to file a separate statement stipulating that upon
the birth of the child, regardless of that child's condition, they
shall assume full parental rights and responsibilities.298 In requir-
ing the natural father and his spouse to restate this commitment,
the bill emphasizes the seriousness of this agreement. A human
life, not a commodity, is to be created by this contract, and some-
one has to be responsible for that life. If the contracting party
truly wishes to have a child, it will accept that infant in any condi-
tion. If the intended parents are unwilling to accept an imperfect
child and feel uncomfortable providing the aforementioned state-
ment, their desire to be a parent will not be viewed as genuine and
the court will not permit them to be surrogate parents. Surrogate
parenting is designed to help infertile couples have children; it is
not designed to help couples create a "perfect" child. The Dunne
bill recognizes the proper goal of surrogate parenting and should
be recommended.
In addition to the statement, a number of other items must
be attached to the petition. These include: a copy of the surrogate
contract, an affidavit from the intended mother's physician verify-
ing her infertile condition, 299 an affidavit from the surrogate's phy-
sician verifying her health and ability to perform as surrogate, an
affidavit from the natural father's doctor confirming his health,
and an affidavit from any other person or entity expected to be
compensated in this transaction. 00 The purpose of this elaborate
process is to provide the presiding judge with enough information
to determine whether these parties are both mentally and physi-
cally capable of entering into such an agreement. It is good policy
294. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 122(3).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. 99 120 & 123.
298. Id. § 123(1).
299. Id. 9 123(2)(b).
300. Id. 9 123 (2)(c)-(e).
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and once again alerts the parties to the intricacies and dangers of
surrogacy.
Step three involves the hearing. Within thirty days of filing
the petition, the court sets a date for the personal examination of
the parties.301 To accommodate a party who wishes to remain
anonymous the court allows for separate hearings.3 2 This accom-
modation permits the couple to maintain their distance from the
surrogate mother. A drawback to this option is that it allows the
procedure to become somewhat mechanical, 3  and to some this is
unacceptable.3 0 4 As stated before, however, we are a society that
values choices. We should allow these choices to exist. This argu-
ment is by far the stronger one.
Once the type of hearing has been determined, whether joint
or separate, the parties, under oath and represented by counsel,
appear before the judge.30 5 In essence, the court attempts to deter-
mine the best interests of the parties 3 6 before conception. The
purpose is to solve the problems before they occur and eliminate
the possibility of another Baby "M".30° The court proceeds by de-
termining whether the parties (including the intended mother) are
"fully informed as to all aspects of the agreement" 308 and have
entered into it knowingly. For the surrogate mother, this require-
ment means being fully aware that she has no right to the child
after its birth. For the intended parents, the requirement means
an awareness, upon the birth of the child, that they have "full
parental responsibilities, including the duty of support of [the]
child."'309 In addition, the judge approves the compensation to be
paid to the surrogate mother.310 This spares the parties the risk of
301. Id. § 124.
302. Id.
303. While requiring the submission of doctors' statements (in the form of affidavits)
makes the procedure somewhat mechanical, the requirement that the parties appear in
person before the judge maintains a personal quality to each agreement.
304. Callahan, supra note 251, at A25, cols. 2-5.
305. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 124(1).
306. The parties to the transaction are defined in § 119(6) as, "the surrogate mother,
her husband, if any, and the intended parents." The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at §
119(6).
307. Foster, supra note 279, at 2, col. 1. In this article, authors Henry Foster, Jr.
and Doris Jonas Freed state that, "[t]he recommendations [enclosed in bill 1429-A] would
cover the Baby M situation in New Jersey where the surrogate reneges . Id. (foot-
notes omitted).
308. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 124(1)(b).
309. Id. §§ 124(l)(c).
310. Id. § 124(1)(e). The elements the judge considers, when determining just corn-
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exploitation. The commissioning couple cannot underpay the sur-
rogate, and the surrogate cannot overcharge for her services. Crit-
ics and advocates alike should be pleased.
Following the personal interviews the court begins its exami-
nation of the affidavits. First, to determine if the intended mother
is truly infertile, and second, to determine whether the surrogate
mother's suggested compensation is reasonable."1 ' If the court is
not satisfied that the woman is infertile it will request that she see
another physician. 12 Again, the court does not take away oppor-
tunities, it provides them. The infertile woman can get a second
opinion, and if that opinion is in her favor, she can continue the
process. An argument against this process, however, is that she
could find a physician who would lie about her condition. The
likelihood of this happening, however, is slim, because the physi-
cian's diagnosis must appear in a sworn statement, and not many
doctors are willing to risk perjury charges.313
Once this process has been completed, the statute requires
each party to receive counselling. 1 4 This requirement further as-
sures the court that all of the parties are prepared to commit
themselves to the agreement. The commissioning couple and the
surrogate mother must be psychologically prepared for these seri-
ous decisions. Overestimating our capabilities is part of the prob-
lem, and any bill worth passing will recognize this fact.
The final phase of the process is reached after the parties
meet with their respective mental health care professionals. Once
again, the parties appear before the court with their counsel. If
the judge is pleased with the psychiatric reports, and determines
that all the parties are capable of meeting the "emotional and psy-
chological consequences of surrogate parenting, '" 1" he will ap-
prove the agreement.3 16 Approval means that "the child shall be
pensation, are as follows:
(1) calculation of anticipated lost wages; (2) actual or anticipated expenses in-
curred; (3) value of time expended; (4) the value of health risks incurred or
likely to be incurred incident to or on account of the surrogate parenting agree-
ment; and (5) such other factors the court deems necessary to consider in the
interests of justice.
Id.
311. Id. §§ 124(2)(a),(b).
312. Id. § 124(2)(a).
313. Perhaps another solution to this dilemma is to have a court appointed doctor.
314. The Dunne Bill, supra note 273, at § 124(3)(b).
315. Id. § 125.
316. Id. Section 125 further requires that once court approval has been given, the
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deemed at birth the legitimate, natural child of the intended par-
ents for all purposes. ' 317 No adoption laws are necessary. This bill
recognizes that surrogacy is a unique process and worthy of its
own regulations and procedures. This realization is important, be-
cause part of the problem with applying old laws to new tech-
niques is that they never truly fit. They were enacted before the
surrogacy procedure was conceived. To expect them to solve the
problems that surrogacy can present is to overestimate their effec-
tiveness and endanger the public. If we truly want to make surro-
gacy a safe and effective process, we must tailor a law to suit its
needs.
As a response to critics'who are opposed to commercial agen-
cies and as a way of removing the commercial stigma from this
procedure, the Dunne bill prohibits commercial surrogacy.31 8
Third parties who wish to participate in this procedure must do so
on a non-profit basis. As stated before, if surrogate parenting is to
be viewed favorably, the commercial aspect must be reduced to a
bare minimum. The surrogate mother, attorneys and counselors
(who are retained after the process begins) should be the only par-
ties receiving compensation for their services.
Finally, the bill recognizes that surrogate mothers are not
machines and that they might change their minds when it comes
time to surrender the baby. In response to this dilemma, the court
allows the surrogate forty-five days after the birth of the child to
apply for a review of the surrogacy agreement. Should the court
find a compelling change of circumstances rendering enforcement
of the contract unsafe or not in the child's best interests, the judge
will annul or modify the agreement.31 This right to review allows
the surrogate to change her mind. The requirement of a compel-
ling change of circumstances also ensures the commissioning
couple of their right to be the child's parents.3 20 Both parties are
treated fairly throughout the process.
"parties [must] execute consent[] to the agreement." Id.
317. Id. § 126.
318. Id. § 129.
319. Id. § 127.
320. The compelling circumstances requirement presents a problem because the
drafters do not define these circumstances, resulting in ambiguity and uncertainty. Perhaps
a compelling circumstance would be the death of the natural father and his wife, or the
discovery that the natural father and his wife are known felons. Until the drafters indicate
what a "compelling circumstance" is, however, we can never be sure. This problem should
be resolved before the Dunne bill passes.
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The Dunne bill is a model bill. It confronts many of the is-
sues of surrogacy and deals with them fully. More importantly, it
provides both judges and lawyers with a formula that is easy to
apply. A bill similar to the Dunne bill is what the United States
needs. As long as there is uncertainty in the area of surrogate
parenting, there remains the possibility of another Baby "M".
3. Filling in the Gaps
In addition to the aforementioned suggestions, legislators
might consider limiting eligibility for surrogate motherhood to
women who are married and have had children. 2' In spite of the
conflict in Baby "M", there is a theory3 22 that women who have
already had children will be better able to give informed consent
to this procedure. They will have experienced the pain of child-
birth and will have felt the strength of the "mother/infant"
bond. 23 Having experienced these things, they will know their
limitations and be better able to decide, when the time comes to
sign the contract, whether they will be able to surrender the
child. 24 Again, the key to certainty is informed consent. If the
surrogate mother knows what she is getting into, she is less likely
to back out of the agreement. If surrogacy is to survive, we need
this certainty.
Considering that one of the main reasons infertile couples
enter into surrogacy agreements is to have a genetically-related
child, state legislators should also consider making paternity tests
a part of the surrogacy process. Assemblyman Halpin of New
York made this proposal in his bill on surrogate parenting. 25 In-
corporating this safeguard assures the contracting parents that
they are receiving the biologically related child they desire.
To protect the newborn child, state legislators should follow
321. Katz, supra note 204, at 2 n.4.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. Id.
325. H. 2403, 1987-1988 Regular Sessions, New York § 65-g (1987). The section of
the Halpin bill referred to is section 65-g. It reads as follows:
Required testing after birth. Not later than twenty-four hours after the birth of
a child born to a surrogate, the natural father, the surrogate, the surrogate's
husband if the surrogate is married, and the child shall submit to procedures
necessary for the performance of blood or tissue typing tests which are intended
to establish the paternity of the child. The results of the tests performed shall be
made available immediately to the surrogate and the natural father.
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Assemblyman Halpin's lead, and stipulate that the child's birth
certificate shall bear no indications that the child was born
through surrogacy.328 This policy protects children from bearing
the stigma of surrogacy, thus enabling them to lead active and
normal lives without putting the world on notice of their uncon-
ventional origins. It also preserves the commissioning couple's
right to tell their child, in their own way, how he was born. This
matter is very private and should be kept out of the public do-
main. Assemblyman Halpin's recognition of this aspect is com-
mendable and noteworthy.
Legislatures should require surrogacy contracts to contain a
clause prohibiting the use of alcohol, drugs, and the smoking of
cigarettes during the pregnancy. 27 Such a clause preserves the
child's prenatal health and development 28 and protects the best
interests of all parties. The surrogate mother will be healthier, the
commissioning couple's chances of having a healthy child will be
increased, and the baby will come into the world free of asthma,
drug addiction, or alcohol dependency.
Finally, state law should require investigations of both the
surrogate mother's and the commissioning couple's homes . 29 As
mentioned before, there is no way of discovering, without an in-
vestigation, whether or not the natural father and his wife will be
suitable parents.33 They could live in a run-down shack without
heat or running water. They could be drug dealers, child abusers,
or murderers. Or they could be two people on the verge of divorce,
hoping to salvage their marriage by means of a child. The surro-
gate mother, similarly, could be a less than ideal candidate for the
job of birth mother. She could share a house with a wife beater or
child abuser, or live in a home without heat or electricity. By
sending qualified personnel from the state social service depart-
326. Id. § 4135(b)(2). The entire section reads as follows: "There shall be no spe-
cific statement on the birth certificate as to the fact that the child was born to a surrogate
mother and such birth certificate shall record the name of the natural father and his
spouse, if he is married." Id.
327. Note, supra note 128, at 1306.
328. Id. at 1307.
329. As Justice Wilentz noted on page forty-six of his opinion: "There is not the
slightest suggestion that any inquiry will be made at any time to determine the fitness of
the Sterns as custodial parents, of Mrs. Stern as an adoptive parent, [or] their superiority
to Mrs. Whitehead .... " In re Baby "M", 109 N.J. 396, 437, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248
(1988). This is a bad idea and clearly the legislature should provide some guarantee that
the child's best interests will be considered.
330. See supra text accompanying note 152.
1988-89]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ment, the courts would be informed of such circumstances. Home
studies could be conducted on both the surrogate and the commis-
sioning couple's homes, and the results compiled in a report to be
filed in the county clerk's office. These studies ensure that the
judge, prior to the hearing suggested by the Dunne bill, will have
access to all information necessary for determining the best inter-
ests of the parties; including the child.
CONCLUSION
Surrogate parenting is a legitimate alternative reproductive
process that can provide the answer to many infertile couples'
prayers-a biologically-related child. As a procedure, however, it
presents many problems. The most notorious of these problems is
the refusal of a surrogate mother to surrender the child. Although
the likelihood of this occurring is rare,33' when it happens all par-
ties are subjected to pain, misery, and heartache. The commission-
ing couple fear the loss of their child, and the surrogate mother
fears having to surrender that child. Courts differ in their ap-
proaches for avoiding this unhappy circumstance. Some say
"adoption" laws should apply, while others say they should not. It
is apparent the legislature must act. Specifically, state legislative
action is required since family law issues belong in the hands of
the state.33 2 Effective, well-drafted state statutes can provide a so-
lution to the Baby "M" dilemma.33 They can make clear from
the beginning of the surrogate relationship that the child born of
surrogacy is the legitimate and natural child of the commissioning
couple at the moment of birth. They can establish standards
which are easy to apply and comprehensive in application. A com-
bination of the measures suggested by the Warnock Committee,
New York Senators Mary Goodhue and John Dunne, and New
York Assemblyman Patrick Halpin would provide state legisla-
tures with just such a statute - a statute containing all of the
331. Surrogacy Can Work, But Laws Are Needed, USA Today, Sept. 3, 1987, at
8A, col. 1. "There have been an estimated 600 children born under [surrogacy] arrange-
ments-a woman hired to bear a child for an infertile couple. Only a few cases haven't
worked out." Id.
332. Note, supra note 128, at 1299. "Surrogate parenthood is an issue for state con-
trol because it involves the conception, paternity, custody, and rearing of children. Histori-
cally, these matters have been subject to state rather than federal regulation." Id. (foot-
notes omitted).
333. Uniform acts have also been proposed as a solution to the many problems surro-
gate parenting presents. For an excellent example, see Note, supra note 128, at 1299-1321.
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elements necessary to make surrogate parenting a safe and effec-
tive process. It is now time to enact such a statute, before another
Baby "M" arises.
MINDY ANN BAGGISH

